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EXECUTIVES AND HEDGING: THE FRAGILE LEGAL
FOUNDATION OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
David M. Schizer*
Options are granted to executives to inspire better performance by tying
pay to the employer's stock price. Yet this incentive rationale no longer holds
if executives can use the derivatives market to simulate a sale of their options,
a practice known as hedging. This Article evaluates the effectiveness of ex-
isting legal constraints on hedging by executives, including limits derived
from contract, securities and tax law. Although investment bankers have
been searching for ways around these constraints, the bottom line is that, at
least for now, executives are unable to hedge option grants: While contrac-
tual limits are rare, the securities law blocks the most straightforward options
hedges by the most senior executives and the tax law blocks the rest (including
"basket" hedges by the most senior executives and all hedges by less senior
ones). In contrast, executives are relatively free to hedge stock. Whereas this
distinction between stock and options can be justified, these legal constraints
should be reformed because the relevant tax rules were not meant to pursue
corporate governance goals. As a result, tax constraints on options hedging
are unstable, as well as over- and under-inclusive. They should be replaced
with more effective contractual and securities law hedging limits.
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INTRODUCTION
In the capital markets, the 1990s were the decade of executive stock
options and derivatives. Enormous option grants have raised executive
pay to staggering new heights, while intensifying its sensitivity to firm
stock prices.1 Growth of the derivatives market has been comparably dra-
matic. 2 Simply put, derivatives are financial bets, which might be about
interest rates, a stock price, or some other financial fact.3 Some deriva-
tives, such as options, have been used for years. Indeed, executive stock
options are derivatives. In contrast, "equity swaps" are relatively new.
4
1. See, e.g.,John Helyar &Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Coffers Gush With Currency of
an Opulent Age, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B1 (calling stock options "the ultimate '90s
status symbol" and noting that "the U.S. Treasury might consider a new motto for the old-
fashioned money it mints: In Options We Trust"). In 1998, the five best-compensated
CEOs split $1.2 billion. See Jennifer Reingold & Ronald Grover, Executive Pay: Special
Report, Bus. Wk., Apr. 19, 1999, at 72, 73; see also id. at 74 (noting that "[1]ong-term
compensation-mostly from exercised options-made up 80% of the average CEO's pay
package, up from 72% in 1997"). The trend also extends to executives below the CEO
rank. See Tom Leander, Raking in the Cash, Global Fin., Aug. 1998, at 16, 16 (noting
83.91% increase in compensation of 76 surveyed CFOs from 1996 to 1997, with the
increase largely attributable to options).
2. See, e.g., Kevin M. Keyes, Federal Taxation of Financial Instruments and
Transactions v (1997) ("The recent growth in the number and variety of financial products
and transactions has been astonishing."); Robert M. McLaughlin, Over-the-Counter
Derivative Products: A Guide to Business and Legal Risk Management and Documentation
xvii (1999) (noting that CFO magazine described 1994 as the "Year of Derivatives").
3. See Global Derivatives Study Group, Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices and
Principles 28 (1993) [hereinafter G-30 Study] ("In the most general terms, a derivatives
transaction is a bilateral contract or payments exchange agreement whose value derives, as
its name implies, from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or
index.").
4. See Keyes, supra note 2, at 14-3 (swaps "have, to put it simply, revolutionized the
financial markets"); Richard L. Reinhold, Tax Issues in Equity Swap Transactions, 57 Tax
Notes 1185, 1186 (1992). A swap is a two-party contract that binds each party to make
periodic payments based on an objective financial indicator, such as an interest rate or
stock price. For a description, see G-30 Study, supra note 3, at 31.
[Vol. 100:440
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Along with new products have come new derivatives dealers, 5 making it
much easier to find a counterparty.
6
Legal scholars and economists have begun to realize that, in combi-
nation, these two trends raise a serious corporate governance concern.
7
Options are supposed to inspire better performance by tying pay to the
stock price, thereby aligning the incentives of managers and sharehold-
ers. This condition, known as "incentive compatibility," no longer holds
if the executive sells the option. Therefore, firms ban sales by contract.
5. See Paula Froelich, OTC Equity Derivatives Are Popular With Investors, Profitable
for Brokers, Wall St. J.,July 26, 1999, at B8H ("There is one hot product area that seems to
be thriving regardless of the market's fate: over-the-counter equity derivatives."); Stephen
Labaton & Timothy L. O'Brien, Financiers Plan to Put Controls on Derivatives, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 7, 1999, at C1 (noting that $37 trillion worth of privately traded derivatives contracts
were outstanding in January 1999, compared to only $865 billion in 1987).
6. Because a derivative is a "bilateral" contract (i.e., between two parties), it is
impossible to engage in a derivatives transaction alone. Another party (the so-called
"counterparty") is needed. The usual counterparty is a derivatives dealer.
7. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, in 2
Alternative Forms of Organization, 100-01 (June 3, 1999) (cautioning that managers could
use derivatives to "liberate their compensation from the firm's performance," so that "both
financial and governance devices can be defeated by this maneuver") (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Eli Ofek & David Yermack,
Taking Stock: Does Equity-Based Compensation Increase Managers' Ownership? N.Y.U.
Working Paper 10 (November 1997) (noting that estimates of selling by executives "are
likely to be under-inclusive... [because] [i] n recent years derivative securities dealers have
developed many ways for managers to realize value from their equity holdings without
having to 'sell' their shares in a legal sense") (postedJuly 28, 1997) <http://www.ssrn.com>
(manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review); Rick Antle & Abbie Smith, An
Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives,
24J. Acct. Res. 1, 6 n.15 (1986) (cautioning that conventional economic analysis of optimal
incentive contracts is potentially flawed because the models do not account for "the effects
of an executive's ability to hedge the risk of ownership of shares in his firm of
employment"); Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 301, 303 (1995) ("The real problem with the trend
toward stock-based compensation and the assumption that it will properly reward and
motivate executives lies in the rapid development of new financial products in the
booming derivatives market."); Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive
Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 399, 402-03 (1998) (warning that
executives can "defease" incentive compensation with derivatives); Paul Bolster et al.,
Executive Equity Swaps and Corporate Insider Holdings, Fin. Mgmt., Summer 1996, at 14,
17-21 (1996) (describing insider's use of equity swap to hedge Autotote stock); Share
Options, Economist, Aug. 7, 1999, at 18 (describing derivatives as a route to "escap[ing]
restrictions on exercising or selling their share options"); J. Carr Bettis et al., Insider
Trading in Derivative Securities: An Empirical Examination of the Use of Zero-Cost
Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, Arizona State University Working Paper
1-5 (May 30, 1999) (testing frequency of stock hedging by insiders and discussing its
corporate governance implications) (posted June 23, 1999) <http://www.ssrn.com>
(manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review); cf. Chip Heath et al., Psychological
Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q.J. Econ. 601, 604 n.4 (assuming that executives
can hedge compensatory options by shorting stock). But cf. Easterbrook, supra, at 99
(noting that the derivatives market can have favorable corporate governance implications
as well, such as allowing market pricing of governance terms to work more efficiently).
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Once a specified "vesting" period has elapsed, firms allow executives to
exercise the option and sell the stock. By this time, though, new unvested
grants are supposed to preserve the desired incentive.8 Yet, what if an
executive could use the derivatives market to simulate a sale of her op-
tions (including unvested ones)-a practice this Article calls "hedg-
ing"9-without violating her contract? The incentive justification for op-
tion grants would no longer hold. Nor could the market (or academic
commentators) ascertain an executive's true level of ownership if she did
not disclose the hedge. In addition, debates about refining incentives
would become less compelling. 10
To assess the urgency of these concerns,1 1 this Article evaluates the
effectiveness of existing legal constraints on hedging by executives, in-
8. New unvested options could also increase an executive's exposure, instead of merely
preserving it. However, executives can avoid an increase by exercising vested options and
selling the stock received. See Ofek & Yermack, supra note 7. Although Professors Ofek
and Yermack describe such behavior as "hedging," see id., this Article refers to such
behavior as "exercise." As used here, "hedging" refers instead to a separate derivatives
transaction whose return cancels out the return from option holdings. For example, an
executive would sell to a derivatives dealer an option like the one received as salary. She
would keep the sales proceeds. Thereafter, any pre-tax gain (or loss) on the hedge would
offset any pre-tax loss (or gain) on the salary option. See infra Part I.B (explaining how
options hedging would work, if not for legal constraints).
9. The term "hedging" is commonly used to describe such transactions. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Zurack et al., Goldman Sachs Equity Derivatives Research: Investment
Considerations for Employee Stock Options 2 (June 30, 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing "practical considerations in hedging
ESOs [executive stock options] with non-employee options"). However, Professors Ofek
and Yermack use the term slightly differently, see supra note 8, as does Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1221-2 (providing tax character rules for hedging of inventory and indebtedness).
10. For example, many have advocated "indexed" options, in which executives are
rewarded for outperforming competitors or the market as a whole, rather than for absolute
increases in stock price. See, e.g., Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relative
Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 30-S, 35-S
(1990) (compensation contracts should filter out industry and market risk); Bengt
Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74, 82-83 (1979) (same);
Geoffrey S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentive to
Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1148 (1985) (advocating indexed options in
which exercise price varies based on value of an index). However, an option's structure
would not matter if executives could neutralize the option with derivatives.
11. This Article focuses on the corporate governance concerns presented by such
hedging, as opposed to tax policy concerns. An example of the latter is that hedging
allows taxpayers to simulate a sale without triggering a taxable realization. Measured
against the Haig-Simons definition of income, this result is not appropriate-but, of
course, neither is the tax law's focus on risk as opposed to changes in economic value. See,
e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 Tax L. Rev.
643, 645 (1995) ("In a pure economic accrual income tax, the element of risk or
uncertainty underlying a taxpayer's gain or loss would matter only insofar as it affected fair
market value."); see also William A. Klein &Joseph Bankman, Federal Income Taxation 76
(11 th ed. 1997) (noting that income definition of R.M. Haig and Henry Simons, which has
become the "rallying call of tax theorists and reformers," defines income as sum of
consumption and change in market value of taxpayer's property). On the other hand, if
we do not adopt a mark-to-market system (e.g., for reasons of administrability), we need a
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cluding limits derived from contract, securities, and tax law. Although
investment bankers have been searching for ways around these con-
straints, the bottom line is that, at least for now, executives are unable to
hedge option grants. While contractual limits are rare, 12 the securities
law blocks some types of options hedging (i.e., the most straightforward
options hedges by the most senior executives)"3 and the tax law blocks
the rest (including "basket" hedges 14 by the most senior executives and
all hedges by less senior ones).15 In contrast, executives are relatively free
to hedge stock,' 6 as opposed to options. Yet although this practice also
raises corporate governance concerns, these concerns usually are less se-
vere because executive stock ownership does not breed unambiguously
good incentives. For this reason, and also for ease of exposition, this Arti-
cle will focus on options hedging, and will refer to stock hedging primar-
ily as a basis for comparison (e.g., to show that a particular legal con-
straint on options hedging does not apply to stock hedging).
Whereas options and stock hedging should be governed via contracts
between executives and firms, within parameters set by the securities law,
line between taxable sale and nontaxable retention of assets. For discussion of this line-
drawing exercise, see David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the
Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627, 1633-37 (1999). These issues are beyond this Article's
scope.
12. Contracts seldom prohibit hedging but often prevent executives from pledging
options, a constraint that can raise the transaction costs of options hedging. See infra Part
I.B & III.A.
13. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1994)) requires so-called "insiders" (i.e., 10% owners, directors, and officers) to disclose
certain hedges and, in some cases, makes hedging illegal. Yet less senior executives, who
still may have sizeable option grants, are not affected by these constraints, and even
insiders may be able to sidestep them with subtler "basket" hedging strategies. See infra
Parts I.B and III.
14. In a basket hedge, the derivative is based-not on the employer's stock price per
se-but on a group of stocks whose value is supposed to track the employer's stock price.
See infra Part I.B.
15. Options hedging could trigger a sizeable tax even when the executive has no
pretax profit, because deductions for hedging losses are of limited value, if available at all.
Specifically, deductions for hedging losses may be deferred indefinitely for two reasons.
First, hedging losses usually are capital, and thus cannot offset ordinary income from the
option; second, the hedge and option would be a "straddle" under section 1092, and
straddle losses are potentially subject to deferral. See I.R.C. § 1092. Unless otherwise
noted, all references in this Article are to the current I.R.C.
Even when available, the deduction is insufficiently generous: An extra dollar of
hedging loss reduces tax by less than an extra dollar of hedging gains increases it. The
gain generates 39.6 cents in tax (since this capital gain is short-term under the straddle
rules), whereas the loss reduces tax by only 20 cents (since it typically reduces long-term
capital gains). See infra Part V.
16. An exception is stock that is granted as salary, which sometimes triggers tax
constraints similar to those on options hedging. See Part V.F.2. For a case study of stock
hedging, see Bolster et al., supra note 7, at 20 (describing Autotote swap). Indeed, the
Bettis et al. study, supra note 7, focused on stock hedges. See Letter from Michael
Lemmon, Assistant Professor, Arizona State University, to Author (noting that hedges
identified in study are of stock, rather than options) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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the current rules depart measurably from this ideal. Indeed, existing
contractual and securities law constraints have significant gaps. In filling
these gaps for options hedging, the U.S. tax law performs a corporate
governance function not recognized in the academic literature.' 7 Nor
did Congress intend to use the tax law in this way, as the relevant rules
were not meant to address agency costs and managerial incentives.
Although a plausible substitute for better contractual and securities
law constraints, at least for now, the tax barrier is potentially unstable and
both over- and under-inclusive. It could unravel due to relatively minor
changes in the tax law that seem unrelated to corporate governance. In-
deed, legislation proposed by the Clinton administration in February
2000, in connection with the 2001 budget, could inadvertently weaken
the tax barrier significantly, although the prospects for passing this legis-
lation in an election year are slim. 18 In its current form, the tax barrier
17. This Article offers a counterexample to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. tax
law impedes corporate governance, or at least pursues governance objectives ineffectively.
For instance, the double tax on corporate profits is said to insulate executives from capital
market discipline by favoring reinvestment of earnings. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M.
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 327 (1995); James R.
Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 697 (1997). Also, the deductibility of interest is said to discourage
corporate innovation. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate
Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1461, 1496
(1993). Scholars have criticized tax penalties for greenmail and golden parachutes, as well
as tax preferences for certain forms of compensation. See Maya Alexandri, Why Deduction
Caps Fail to Solve the "Problem" of CEO Pay, Tax Notes, November 30, 1998, at 1128
(arguing that, although the market for executive compensation is failing, section 162(m) is
a flawed solution); Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law In
Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax On
Greenmail, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 789, 828 (1988) (concluding that "the use of this tax to
discourage greenmail is not justified from a tax policy perspective"); Susan J. Stabile, Is
There A Role For Tax Law In Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81,
98 (1998) ("Compensation is a matter for the market and private parties and not one
requiring government involvement."); Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881,
35 Vill. L. Rev. 131, 132 (1990) ("As a matter of tax policy, the Code provisions pertaining
to greenmail and golden parachutes.., are not defensible additions to the tax law."); Kurt
Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to
Regulate the Market for Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DePaul Bus.
L.J. 159, 178-87 (1993) (criticizing use of federal tax system to regulate market for
takeovers).
18. This legislation, a proposed change in the straddle rules, is discussed infra note
160. It would inadvertently eliminate mismatches in character between option gains and
hedging losses, while preserving (and perhaps intensifying) mismatches in timing.
Specifically, the proposal would require certain hedging losses to be added to the basis of
the hedged asset, instead of simply deferring deduction of these losses (as under current
law). As a result, options hedging losses that otherwise would be capital might have the
effect of ordinary losses. By adding these losses to the option's basis, executives could
reduce their ordinary income from the option, thereby avoiding a character mismatch.
Timing mismatches would remain, though, because some of the hedging losses would be
allocated to options that were not being hedged. Because it is unclear whether this
[Vol. 100:440
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punishes options hedging strategies that shareholders might favor, 19
along with those they would not. It also applies only to U.S. taxpayers.
Although option grants have been used mostly by U.S. firms (i.e., for ex-
ecutives who are subject to U.S. tax), foreign firms are beginning to use
options.2 0 Export of this U.S. compensation practice is inappropriate un-
less foreign executives are constrained from hedging, a function the U.S.
tax law usually will not serve.
Accordingly, this Article makes two recommendations. First, every
firm should address hedging by contract: In general, most forms of op-
tions hedging should be prohibited, while stock hedging and options
hedging with a broad-based basket hedge should be permitted if dis-
closed. Second, the U.S. securities law restrictions and disclosure require-
ments for hedging should be clarified and expanded, and analogous re-
gimes should be adopted in other jurisdictions.
Part I describes stock options and the mechanics of hedging. Part II
considers corporate governance concerns raised by options hedging, con-
trasts the less severe concerns raised by stock hedging, and explains the
appeal of these practices to executives. Part III describes existing contrac-
tual and securities law constraints on hedging. Parts IV and V show the
way U.S. tax law fills gaps in these constraints. Specifically, Part IV de-
scribes the way the U.S. tax law discourages (but does not prevent) execu-
tives from exercising options. Part V shows the tax law's punitive treat-
ment of options hedging (which currently does prevent the practice),
and then describes the more favorable tax treatment of stock hedging.
Part VI considers advantages and disadvantages of relying on the tax law
for these functions. Part VII offers recommendations. The conclusion
considers implications for the literature on stock options, derivatives,
comparative corporate governance, and the role of tax law in corporate
governance.
legislative proposal will be enacted, and if so in what form, this Article discusses current
law, except where otherwise indicated. Yet this proposal reinforces the point that the tax
barrier is potentially unstable.
19. Basket hedges that screen out risk of broad market movements, while leaving the
executive with firm-specific risk, may be favored by shareholders. See infra Part II.A.1.
Executives would in effect synthesize the "indexed" options discussed in supra note 10.
20. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and
Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 865, 890 (1997) (noting that in Japan, legal prohibitions on options were recently
lifted, and firms are beginning to offer options); Leslie Chang, Chinese Firms Find
Incentive to Use Stock-Compensation Plans, Wall St.J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A42 (Chinese firms
are beginning to offer option grants); Julia Flynn, Performance-Based Pay Spreads Across
Europe, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at B9D (reporting that Towers Perinn's survey of 460
firms in 13 companies shows that U.S.-style pay-for-performance is becoming increasingly
common in Europe); David Cay Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 1998, at Cl (noting globalization of options as compensation); Kevin J. Murphy,
Executive Compensation 8-9 (April 1998) (noting that in recent years "interest in stock
options is exploding . .. in the Pacific Rim and in Europe and Latin America") (posted
May 19, 1999) <http://www.ssm.com> (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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I. DESCRIPTION OF STOCK OPTIONS AND HEDGING
This Part describes executive stock options and how, if not for legal
constraints, executives could hedge them with derivatives.
A. Executive Stock Options and the Traditional Exit Strategy: Exercising the
Option and Selling the Stock
An executive stock option entitles the executive to buy some number
of shares (a step known as "exercising the option") from her employer at
a specified price (the "exercise price") on or before the "maturity" date.21
For example, this "call" option may permit the executive to buy 10,000
shares for $10 at any time in the next ten years.
An option is a valuable right-indeed, it is valuable even if the stock
price has not risen above the exercise price. The option allows the execu-
tive to choose to buy the stock at $10 (e.g., if it is trading above $10) but
does not obligate her to do so (e.g., if it is trading below $10). This
choice has value in offering unlimited opportunity for gain (as the stock
price rises above $10) with limited risk of loss. If the stock price falls to
zero, the executive loses only what she paid for the option (the so-called
"premium")-which, for the executive, is the cash salary she gave up to
get it. In addition, an option is valuable in sparing the holder from com-
mitting capital, since the option costs less than the underlying stock.
Given these two advantages, an option has value (known as "time value")
beyond its so-called "intrinsic value" (i.e., the amount the holder can earn
by exercising it on a given day).22
Since options appreciate with stock price, executives who hold them
have an incentive to drive up the stock price. Instead of keeping an op-
tion indefinitely, executives eventually will want to spend their gains or,
perhaps, to diversify by investing in something else. Recognizing this re-
ality, firms allow executives to "cash out" by exercising the option (that is,
tendering the exercise price in return for stock) and then selling the
stock received. To preserve the executive's incentive, firms take two
steps. First, they prevent an executive from exercising the option until a
specified "vesting" period has elapsed. For example, the vesting period
might be four years, with one-quarter of the grant vesting each year. Sec-
ond, firms can monitor the number of unexercised options and, if the
number falls below a desired level, adjust subsequent pay accordingly
21. For a detailed description of these options, see, e.g., Arthur H. Kroll,
Compensating Executives: Drafting and Managing Tax-Advantaged Arrangements 41-43
(1998) (describing typical option). Such options to buy are known as "call" options. In
contrast, options to sell are called "put" options.
22. For a discussion of an option's time value, see McLaughlin, supra note, 2 at 81
("Although the mathematics of time value are extraordinarily complex, conceptually time
value is simply the value that is attributable to uncertainty regarding the price of the
underlying fidget over time prior to expiration.... [S]ome time prior to expiration the
fidget prices might rise above the strike price."); see also Robert W. Kolb, Financial
Derivatives 91 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that options have value in excess of intrinsic value).
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(e.g., by offering relatively less cash and more options and by lengthening
the vesting period of new grants).
Exercise is a relatively easy exit strategy for firms to police. Since the
firm is the counterparty on the option, executives cannot exercise it with-
out the firm's consent.23 The firm can keep an executive from selling the
option by refusing to honor a successor's rights, thus scaring off potential
buyers. Moreover, the economics of options inherently discourages exer-
cise, since this step extinguishes an option's time value. Thus, before it
matures, an option to pay $10 for stock trading at $50 is worth more than
the $40 the holder could get by exercising it and selling the stock. Fi-
nally, the tax law discourages exercise because this step triggers the em-
ployee's tax liability.
B. Hedging as an Alternative Exit Strategy: Illustrative Examples
If not for legal constraints discussed below, the derivatives market
would offer executives a new exit strategy, hedging, that extends none of
these advantages to the firm. The executive would enter into a formally
separate transaction whose return would cancel out the return on the
option. For example, she might sell an option with the same exercise
price as the one received from her firm. Just like exercise, then, hedging
offers cash proceeds and insulation from changes in the option's value.
However, the firm has less control over this exit strategy. Whereas
exercise of an option is a transaction with the firm, hedging is a transac-
tion with a third party-such as a derivatives dealer. Thus, the firm's con-
sent is no longer inherently necessary. Nor will the firm know the execu-
tive is "exiting" in this way unless she discloses this information, but
disclosure obligations are somewhat porous under current law.
24
Although the firm ought to negotiate for contractual limits on hedging,
such provisions are relatively uncommon. 25 Indeed, absent some other
constraint, executives could hedge unvested options, even though they
could not exercise them. Unlike exercise, hedging does not require the
executive to forgo the option's time value. Just as selling the option
would not extinguish its time value-since the new holder would have the
benefit of this time value and thus would pay the seller for it-hedging
can also preserve the time value, since it involves the sale of a comparable
option. Finally, hedging allows an executive to defer the tax liability
otherwise triggered by exercise of the option. In so doing, she also defers
23. Firms will not necessarily know that the executive has sold the stock, absent
disclosure. Even so, the disclosure obligation for sales of stock is clear. In addition, firms
should probably assume that executives are selling the stock received upon exercise. If the
executive wishes to remain exposed to the stock, there are economic incentives to do it
through the option (e.g., its time value). Furthermore, it is very common for executives to
sell stock received upon exercise. See Heath et al., supra note 7, at 606 ("the great
majority of option-holders immediately sell the stock acquired on exercise").
24. See infra Part III.B.1.
25. See infra Part III.A.
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the firm's tax deduction, and thus unilaterally shifts a portion of her tax
liability to the firm.
2 6
The mechanics of hedging can best be illustrated with examples.
Before turning to them, two caveats are in order. First, although existing
legal constraints deter options hedging in the United States, the follow-
ing examples assume away these constraints. Second, whereas the
hedged asset in these examples is an option, the mechanic for hedging
stock is similar.
Assume that on January 1, 2000, an executive receives a ten-year op-
tion (the "Compensatory Option") to buy 10,000 shares of her employer's
stock at its January 1, 2000, price of $10. The option is worth $30,000
when granted. This amount derives solely from the option's time value,
since the stock price is not higher than the exercise price. By contract,
the executive can never sell the Compensatory Option and cannot exer-
cise it until it "vests" on January 1, 2003.
To hedge immediately, the executive would sell a comparable call
option (the "Market Option") to a derivatives dealer (the "Dealer"). This
strategy would yield an immediate cash payment of $30,000, attributable
to the Market Option's time value. As shown in Table 1, the pre-tax re-
turns on the Market and Compensatory Options would always cancel out,
netting to $30,000 (e.g., whether the stock price fell to $5 or rose to $25).
TABLE 1: PRE-TAx RETURN FROM IMMEDIATE HEDGE
Maturity Return on Return on Net Pre-Tax
Stock Price Compensatory Option Market Option Return
5 027 30,00028 30,000
25 150,00029 (120,000)30 30,000
Alternatively, the executive could wait for the Compensatory Option
to appreciate before hedging it. Assume that on January 1, 2001, a year
after the Compensatory Option was granted, the stock price has soared
from $10 to $100. The Compensatory Option is now worth at least
$900,000.
26. See infra Part IV.B. Yet options hedging triggers adverse tax consequences for the
executive that outweigh this benefit. See infra Part V.
27. The return would be zero because the Compensatory Option's $10 exercise price
exceeds the $5 market price, and so the option would expire worthless.
28. The return on the Market Option would be the $30,000 proceeds from selling it.
The executive would make no payments to the holder of the Market Option, since it would
expire worthless.
29. Since the stock price has risen $15 above the $10 exercise price, the executive
would earn $15 per share, or $150,000.
30. The executive would be forced to sell stock to the holder of the Market Option for
$10 per share (or $100,000), even though it is worth $25 per share (or $250,000). She thus
would lose $150,000 upon exercise, which is offset by the $30,000 proceeds from selling the
Market Option. Her net loss would be $120,000.
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To lock in past gains without surrendering the right to future gains,
the executive could buy the right to sell 10,000 shares for $100 per share
in two years. This "put option" would guarantee a $900,000 spread on
the Compensatory Option, even if the stock price fell. 31 However, the
put would not obligate her to sell at $100 (e.g., if the stock price rises to
$200). This flexibility is expensive: The cost of the put (in this example,
assume $300,000) would reduce her guaranteed return (from $900,000
to $600,000).32
To avoid this expense, the executive could pay for the put by giving
her counterparty a call option, instead of cash. In a so-called "collar," she
would buy a put (that would protect her past gains) and sell a call (that
would transfer future gains to the counterparty).3s For example, the put
might let her sell the stock at $100 and the call might let her counterparty
buy the stock from her at $120. As Table 2 shows, the collar would lock in
a minimum gain of $90 per share or $900,000 (since the executive could
always sell the stock for at least $100). Likewise, the collar would limit the
potential profit to $110 per share (since the counterparty would buy the
stock for $120 per share if it were trading higher). 4
TABLE 2: PRE-TAx RETURN FROM PosT-APPRECIATION HEDGE
Change From
Maturity Gain on Initial Gain of Return Net Pre-Tax
Stock Price Compensatory Option $900,000 on Hedge Return
40 300,000 (600,000) 600,000 900,000
200 1,900,000 1,000,000 (800,000) 1,100,000
In some cases the derivatives described above would trigger contrac-
tual bans, disclosure requirements, or other securities law constraints. 35
To avoid these constraints (but not the tax constraint), executives could
use derivatives based not on the employer's stock, but on a group (or
31. If the stock is trading at $40 on January 1, 2003, she could buy it for $10 with her
Compensatory Option and then sell it for $100 with the put, thereby netting $90 per share,
or $900,000.
32. Given its significant expense, this hedging strategy is not popular even when tax
and other barriers are absent. Cf. Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 7 tbl.8 (noting that a
"concern" about put-based hedging strategy is that "[ u ] p-front cost usually [is] higher than
collar"). This cost can be reduced somewhat with a "put spread," which offers loss
protection for losses only in a specified range (e.g., dollar-for-dollar reimbursement as the
stock price falls from $100 to $70, and no payment for further declines).
33. This result can be attained through different types of derivatives, including swaps,
contingent debt, and forward contracts. While the economic differences among these
forms can be modest, tax consequences can prove very different. For a discussion of the
tax treatment of these structures, see infra Part V.E.
34. Thus, if the stock price fell to $40, she would buy stock for $10 with her
Compensatory Option and sell it for $100 with her put, leaving her a $90 per share profit
(or $900,000). If instead the stock were trading at $200, she would buy it for $10 and sell it
for the $120 she committed to accept on the short call. As a result, her profit would be
$110 per share (or $1,100,000).
35. See infra Part III.
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"basket") of stocks whose value tracks the employer's stock price. For
example, an executive at an oil company ("OilCo") could use a collar on
a basket of oil stocks, on the theory that oil stocks respond similarly to
changed market conditions. 36 Yet, although it is a hedge against industry
or market-wide declines, the basket would offer less protection from firm-
specific risk (which might be of particular concern to the undiversified
executive). For example, if OilCo caused an oil spill but the rest of the
industry was prospering, the executive could lose money on both the
OilCo option and the hedge. 3 7 To avoid this scenario, the executive
could represent OilCo disproportionately in the basket, but then her ar-
gument for not disclosing the hedge would become considerably more
aggressive.
To sum up, this Article considers four types of hedges, which are
described in the following Table:
TABLE 3: FOUR TYPES OF HEDGES
Name Description Effect
Single-stock options Derivative based on employer's stock Perfect tracking
hedge
Disproportionate Derivative based on basket of stocks, Near perfect tracking
basket hedge including employer's stock, which is
disproportionately represented
Broad-based basket Derivative based on basket of stocks, and Does not eliminate
hedge employer's stock is not disproportionately firm-specific risk
represented
Stock hedge Hedged asset is stock, instead of option; Any of the above
while each of above variations is possible, three results,
a single-stock version of stock hedges is depending upon
intended in this Article, absent an express type of stock hedge
statement to the contrary.
II. OPrIoNS HEDGING AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM
Section A describes three corporate governance concerns raised by
options hedging and explains why this exit strategy raises more serious
concerns than two others: exercise of the option followed by sale of the
stock, and stock hedging. Section B describes the appeal of hedging to
executives.
36. For the returns to track, their values should move in the same direction (i.e.,
positive correlation) by approximately the same amount (i.e., comparable volatilities).
The most commonly used standard, "tracking error," equals the square root of the sum of
the variances minus twice the covariance. See Neil Chriss et al., Correlation, Tracking and
Risk, and Dynamic Asset Allocation, Global Equity and Derivatives Markets (Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, New York, N.Y.), June 6, 1997, at 1, 4.
37. See Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 7 (expressing concern about "tracking" risk).
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A. Corporate Governance Concerns About Options Hedging
1. Incentive Effects. - The usual justification for option grants in
both academia and the markets is to align the incentives of management
and shareholders.38 Options also increase an executive's appetite for
risk, an effect that diversified shareholders value because they are other-
wise more risk-tolerant than undiversified managers.39 Once sold or
hedged, however, an option no longer motivates an executive because
her personal wealth ceases to be tied to the stock price.
Whereas this concern applies to hedges that replicate sales, such as
single-stock hedging and basket hedging where the employer's stock is
disproportionately represented, it does not apply to broad-based basket
hedges that screen out industry or market risk, but not firm-specific risk.
The latter hedge is a bet that the employer will outperform the industry
or market-a bet that intensifies an executive's motivation. The executive
is, in effect, synthesizing an "indexed" option.
40
38. See, e.g., Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on
Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. Fin. 617, 617 (1990) ("Improved incentives are the
reason most often cited by firms seeking shareholder approval for the adoption of stock
option plans."); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976)
(proposing equity compensation as substitute for shareholder monitoring); David
Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 237,
242-47 (1995) (noting that options are supposed to reduce agency costs). An option's
incentive effects are borne out by some, but not all, empirical literature. For example,
firms that pay relatively more of the CEO's compensation in equity tend to have higher
returns. See Robert Tempest Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent
Equity Performance, 79 Journal of Political Economy 1278 (1971) (higher share price);
Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,
38 J. Fin. Econ. 163 (1995) (higher Tobin's q and higher return on assets); cf. John J.
McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595, 603-09 (1990) (corporate performance improves as
management's stock ownership rises from 0% to 40%, but declines beyond 40%). For a
current survey of the literature, see Murphy, supra note 20, at 41-44 ("Overall, the
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that stock-based incentives are important drivers
of managerial actions and corporate performance. There remains little direct evidence,
however, on the returns a company can expect from introducing aggressive performance-
based compensation plans. The evidence is, at best, suggestive . . . ."). For studies that
question the effectiveness of options, see Ellis, supra note 7, at 414 n.58, 415 n.59 (offering
citations).
39. Option holders favor risk because their return is asymmetric: They share fully in
gains but not in losses. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of
Corporate Acquisitions 249 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the asymmetric return of options
and noting their utility as compensation for risk-averse managers). In contrast, an adverse
incentive effect of options is that they discourage managers from paying dividends
(assuming the option payoff is not adjusted for dividends). See Calvin H. Johnson, Stock
Compensation: The Most Expensive Way to Pay Future Cash, 52 SMU L. Rev. 423, 442
(1999) ("Stock options . .. create truly bizarre incentives for management to squelch
dividends . . . ."). But see Murphy, supra note 20, at 17 (some options offer dividend
adjustments).
40. With such a hedge, as with an "indexed option," the executive makes money even
if her stock price declines-as long as it declines less than the industry or market as a
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2. Transparency and Transaction Costs. - The case against hedging is
strongest if options create useful incentives. Even if they do not, however,
it is better for the firm not to give options in the first place than for
executives to alter the bargain unilaterally.41 Hedging imposes signifi-
cant transaction costs on the executive. Moreover, to the extent that
hedging can be done secretly, as often is the case under current disclo-
sure rules, boards and shareholders are less able to defend their interests.
Only the executive knows her "true" pay. Without this information, it is
harder for firms to craft optimal compensation contracts and for share-
holders to evaluate the firm.
Even if options constitute inefficient compensation, hedging is the
wrong solution. Instead, firms should substitute other types of pay.
4 2
Nor must a firm give options-as opposed to other "performance-based"
pay, such as bonuses based on earnings-in order to claim a tax deduc-
tion.43 Admittedly, the favorable accounting treatment accorded options
cannot be duplicated: Certain options never cause expense on a firm's
income statement.44 To the extent that accounting rules induce overuse
of options45-including overuse of a particular type of option 46-hedg-
whole. Correspondingly, she does not make money when her stock price rises unless it
rises more than the industry or market as a whole. Such a payment structure offers better
incentives than conventional options. See supra note 10.
41. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1461, 1474 (1989) ("[Algents whose interests may materially diverge from the interests of
their principals should not have the power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the
rules that govern those divergences of interest.").
42. See generally Kroll, supra note 21, at 40-49 (discussing various methods of
compensation).
43. Under section 162(m), annual compensation above $1 million generally is not
deductible unless it is "performance-based," a category that includes options but is not
limited to them. See I.R.C. § 162(m). For a discussion, see infra Part IV.A.
44. As long as options have a fixed exercise price at least equal to the stock price on
the grant date, they do not give rise to expense on the income statement when they are
granted or exercised. All the company has to do (and this requirement has been imposed
only recently) is list the option's estimated value in a footnote. For a discussion of these
rules, see Pat McConnell et al., Employee Stock Option Expense Pro Forma Impact on EPS
and Operating Margins 2-4 (Bear Stearns Equity Research, May 1, 1998). The inaccuracy
of this accounting is easy to see. Even an out-of-the-money option has time value. While
the firm does not have to spend cash to supply the option, it does forgo cash it could have
earned by selling options in the capital markets.
45. The extent to which accounting rules influence managers' behavior is a subject of
debate. For a discussion, see, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter:
An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 Del.
J. Corp. L. 141, 155-56, 190-91 (1997).
46. Favorable accounting treatment is not available to indexed options (i.e., which
pay only executives who outperform the market or a peer group). See James J. Angel &
Douglas M. McCabe, Market-Adjusted Options for Executive Compensation (Jan. 31, 1997)
(arguing that indexed options are rare because they do not receive favorable accounting
treatment) (posted Apr. 25, 1996) <http://www.ssrn.com> (manuscript on file with the
Columbia Law Review). With a broad-based basket hedge, executives can transform a
conventional option to an indexed option. A disadvantage of the tax barrier is that it
blocks these pro-shareholder hedges along with the others.
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ing might be justified as a "second-best" way to undo these distortions.
Even so, it is better to fix the accounting rule. In understating compensa-
tion expense, the accounting rule already imposes information costs.
Hedging is a poor way to "correct" these distortions because it creates
additional information costs.
3. Pareto Superior Compensation Contracts. - In undermining the
transparency of compensation contracts, hedging can adversely affect the
executive, as well as the firm and shareholders. An executive usually
wants a premium to accept options instead of cash, since options force
her to defer consumption and bear risk.47 Options make her less diversi-
fied, since her professional reputation is already tied to the firm's suc-
cess.48 In a well-functioning market, boards should not offer a premium
if they expect executives to undo the desired incentive by hedging.49 For
the same reason, the market should discount the firm's stock. To head
off these penalties, executives may wish to precommit not to hedge.
Otherwise, a Pareto superior contract-a premium for the executive, the
incentive effect for shareholders-would not be attained.
4. Comparison with Exercise of Option and Sale of Stock. - Just as hedg-
ing terminates the incentive provided by an option, so too does exercise
of the option followed by sale of the stock received. Even so, hedging is
potentially more detrimental in several ways. First, as long as vesting lim-
its apply only to exercise, but not to hedging, hedging can eliminate all of
an executive's exposure to the stock price in a way that exercise cannot.
50
Second, if hedging is not disclosed, it obstructs transparency in con-
tracting in a way that exercise does not (i.e., because the firm, as
counterparty, is always on notice of exercise). Third, hedging evades a
financial penalty-loss of time value-that discourages exercise. Finally,
if the tax consequences of hedging were not otherwise unappealing to an
executive, hedging would enable her, unilaterally, to transfer a tax bene-
47. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management
187-88 (1992) (noting that risk averse managers demand reward for accepting incentive
contracts). Of course, if the executive has inside information that the stock price will rise,
she will accept options without a premium. See David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock
Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. Fin. 449, 462-66 (1997)
(presenting evidence that executives increase levels of option compensation prior to
favorable announcements).
48. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 47, at 430 (noting that manager's human
capital is tied to firm performance).
49. Boards might favor options not for the incentive effect, but for their favorable
accounting treatment. If so, boards might object less strenuously to hedging. Even so, this
accounting arbitrage-granting options so they will be hedged-should not be
encouraged, as it interferes with transparency.
50. Of course, her human capital remains at risk. In defense of hedging, some
hedges eliminate only a portion, but not all, of an executive's exposure to the stock price.
For instance, the collar described supra in Table 2 leaves the executive exposed to price
movements between $90 and $110, while exercise of this option and sale of the stock
eliminates this exposure. Nevertheless, continued exposure can be ensured through more
transparent and effective means, such as longer vesting periods.
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fit from the firm to herself. She would attain an outcome like exercise
but her tax would be deferred 5l-and with it, the firm's deduction.
52
5. Comparison with Stock Hedging. - While the focus here has been
on options hedging, governance concerns also arise when an executive
hedges stock (e.g., acquired in a market purchase or through exercise of
an option), but existing legal constraints are much less effective. This
disparity can prove problematic because stock hedging, if not adequately
disclosed, can keep shareholders from assessing the level of executive
share ownership. Since the executive can still vote hedged shares, she
might use the vote to entrench her position. To the extent that executive
stock ownership reduces agency costs, hedging eliminates this benefit.
Yet stock hedging raises less severe governance concerns than op-
tions hedging. First, stock may inspire less favorable incentives for execu-
tives than options, and so hedging stock would, correspondingly, do less
harm. Like an option, stock can make an executive less diversified, mak-
ing her more risk averse and thus increasing the divide between manag-
ers and diversified (and risk-tolerant) shareholders. Unlike an option,
though, stock does not contain a built-in antidote for this risk aversion.
5 3
Second, as long as options cannot be hedged, an executive's ability to
hedge stock is less important: The options by themselves create an ade-
quate incentive if sufficiently valuable. Finally, the above critique of
hedging focuses not only on incentives, but also on transparency and
Pareto-superiority in compensation contracts. The latter concerns weigh
51. Exercise triggers an executive's tax liability and the firm's deduction, see infra
notes 105-106 and accompanying text, but hedging does not. See infra Part V.B.
52. Better contracts and disclosure would go a long way toward narrowing the
normative gap between hedging and exercise. Some disparity could remain, though,
because hedging is inherently harder to monitor. On the other hand, hedging could
prove appealing to a firm in at least one circumstance: If the firm has a zero tax rate (e.g.,
because of net operating losses), it will not incur added tax in facilitating the executive's
tax deferral and thus can negotiate to share in the tax savings through reductions in the
executive's other compensation. Yet transparency concerns militate against such a
compensation strategy. Moreover, from the perspective of society as a whole, as opposed
to shareholders, such tax planning arguably is undesirable because it reduces tax revenue
while creating transaction costs and distorting taxpayer behavior. However, the effect of
hedging on our tax system's efficiency and equity is beyond the scope of this Article.
53. Options increase an executive's appetite for risk by capping risk of loss. Stock
returns, in contrast, are not asymmetric in this way. The concern, supported by empirical
evidence, is that executives who hold stock are more likely to diversify or hedge excessively
at the firm level than executives who hold options. See, e.g., Peter Tufano, Who Manages
Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining
Industry, 51 J. Fin. 1097 (1996) (firms whose managers hold more stock are more likely to
hedge gold price risk than firms whose managers hold more options); see also Brian J.
Hall, The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options 11-29 (July 1998)
(arguing that options create better incentives than stock) (posted Aug. 18, 1998) <http://
www.ssrn.com> (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). However, the
dichotomy between stock and options should not be overstated. Once an option has
appreciated (i.e., so that it is "deep-in-the-money"), declines in the stock price can cause
loss on the option. An option with such symmetric returns can create similar risk and
incentive effects as stock.
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less heavily for stock hedging because, unlike an executive's options, her
stock holdings are less likely to be governed by a contract with the firm.
5 4
In sum, the four types of hedges discussed in this Article have differ-
ent effects and thus different implications for corporate governance:
TABLE 4: NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF FOUR TYPES OF HEDGING
Type Effect Reason
Single-stock options hedge Usually undesirable Undermines incentives and
transparency
Disproportionate basket Usually undesirable Same
hedge
Broad-based basket hedge Possibly desirable Should enhance incentives, but
undermines transparency
Stock hedge Less clear Might enhance incentives (if stock
ownership induces excessive
managerial risk aversion), but
undermines transparency
B. Interest of Executives in Hedging
While options hedging (and to a lesser extent stock hedging) raise
governance concerns, the practice could prove tempting to executives.
Stock hedging is fairly common.5 5 Because executives frequently ask
about the feasibility of options hedging, investment banks have invested
considerable time and money in attempts (thus far unsuccessful) to de-
velop a hedging strategy that does not trigger legal barriers described
below.5 6 At first blush, executives' interest in options hedging may be
54. In contrast, stock hedging does raise such concerns if the firm contractually
requires executives to own a minimum amount of stock.
55. See Ruth Simon, Hedging a Single Stock Has Ups, Downs, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 2000,
at Cl ("It's impossible to precisely gauge the popularity of these hedges, but derivatives
specialists suggest that hundreds, perhaps even a couple of thousand, are executed each
year.").
56. See, e.g., Kroll, supra note 21, at 82-83 (noting that "[i]n recent years, investment
banking firms have marketed [diversification strategies such as cashless collars] among
executives" and deeming requests for assistance in diversifying "a common question that
compensation professionals must address"); Shaifali Puri, New Tools for the Options
Crowd, Fortune, Nov. 10, 1997, at 308 (describing "a growing number of banks' private
banking units" marketing derivatives to help executives hedge); Randall Smith, For
Internet Glitterati, It's a Matter of Timing, Wall St. J., June 28, 1999, at CI (describing
"cottage industry" emerging among Wall Street derivatives experts "to advise Silicon Valley
executives whose wealth may be tied up in stock or options"); Renee Deger, Locked In?
Buy That New Mansion Now (Sept. 23, 1999) (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://
www.callaw.com/opinions/stories/edt0923.htm> (noting that "[c]lients hear about such
[hedging] instruments periodically from investment bankers").
This lack of success is reported in a marketing pamphlet prepared by the equity
derivatives group at Goldman Sachs. See Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 8:
[H]edging ESOs [employee stock options] with non-employee stock options is
especially difficult for Insiders because of legal restrictions, but even non-Insiders
must address the issues of the different tax treatment between ESOs (ordinary
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surprising since hedging may induce reductions in future pay.57 Never-
theless, the executive's true self interest lies in no one knowing (or assum-
ing) that she is hedging. Hedging in secret, which is sometimes plausible
under current law, should not trigger reductions in future pay, even if the
board is sufficiently independent to punish the executive (which may not
always be the case). Similarly, the market would not have evidence to
justify discounting the firm's stock, even if such discounting would deter
the executive (which, again, may not always be the case).58
For the executive, then, options hedging offers the liquidity and di-
versification advantages of cash salary59 along with a risk premium (as-
suming the board is unaware of the hedge). Once options have appreci-
ated, hedging allows the executive to spend her gains.60 The practice is
also appealing if she believes the stock price has peaked, 61 perhaps based
income) and "nonemployee" options (capital gains), and the inability of ESOs to
serve as usable collateral to offset certain option positions.
Conversations with equity derivatives experts at several major investment banks confirm
that no one has yet developed a hedge that avoids these barriers, and so options hedging is
uncommon. These individuals did not want their names or institutions identified.
57. See supra Part II.A.3. A related concern is that the counterparty might offer a
discounted "lemon" price on the hedge, since hedging by an executive could be a negative
indication of the firm's projected value. However, an investment bank, the usual
counterparty, would not demand this discount if (as is likely) it is hedging its own position
by selling short in the public market. See Lewis R. Steinberg, Using OTC Equity
Derivatives for High-Net-Worth Individuals, in The Use of Derivatives in Tax Planning 211,
242 n.110 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998) (derivatives dealers "will generally not enter into
'long' side of a hedging transaction" unless they can hedge by shorting the underlying
equity). Nor would the investment bank worry about the price it gets on the short sales,
because they can be completed before the executive discloses the hedge. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994) (allowing disclosure up to 10
days after end of month in which change in beneficial ownership occurred); see also 7
C.F.R. § 240.16a-3 (1999) (describing filing requirements for Form 4).
58. A hedged executive, after all, is protected from declines in the stock price (except
from reputational effects), assuming she hedges before these declines are triggered.
59. Cf. Heath et al., supra note 7, at 603 (diversification and liquidity encourage
executives to exercise).
60. This desire to hedge does not derive from risk aversion, but from the executive's
preference for current rather than future consumption. Cf. Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion
to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics, 146J. Inst'l & Theoretical Econ. 216,
216 (1990) (arguing that scholars should "invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last
resort"). Note that executives cannot necessarily finance consumption with borrowing,
because lenders will be unwilling to risk lending against the full value of an unhedged
stock option.
61. Cf. Heath et al., supra note 7, at 623 (noting empirical evidence that executives
exercise in order to lock in gains above a "reference point" based on previous year's
maximum value). To an extent, the executive may expect the firm to "reprice" her options
if the stock price declines. See Christopher Gay, Hard To Lose, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at
R6 (when market dips, executives frequently seek to have exercise price on existing grants
"repriced," i.e., reduced to current market levels). Recent accounting changes discourage
such repricing, however. See Jennifer Reingold, Slimmer Rewards for a Job Poorly Done,
Bus. Wk., Feb. 15, 1999, at 38 (noting Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposal to
force firms to list expense of repriced options on income statement). An executive who
hedges, moreover, still benefits from the repricing, which offers her new opportunity for
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on inside information or-more likely, if she is going to use the informa-
tion to trade-on an insider's jaundiced assessment of publicly-available
facts. Similarly, appreciation of the options increases the executive's
wealth that is subject to firm-specific risk,62 thus increasing the execu-
tive's interest in diversifying.
63
III. EXISTING CONTRACTUAL AND SECURITIES LAw BARRIERS TO HEDGING
Part II of this Article showed that while hedging-particularly op-
tions hedging-can have adverse consequences for shareholders (and, in-
deed, for executives), the practice might nonetheless prove tempting to
executives. Given these competing interests, a contractual resolution
might be expected, perhaps with input from the securities laws. This Part
describes existing contractual and federal securities law constraints on
options hedging.64 Although these constraints block some types of hedg-
ing, they contain significant gaps that are largely filled by the tax law.
Contract and the securities laws also contain even fewer restrictions on
stock hedging and these larger gaps generally are not filled by the tax law.
gain (i.e., the difference between the old and new exercise prices) that she has not sold
through the hedge.
62. See Pallavi Gogoi, False Impressions: More Companies Require Top Executives to
Own Stock. The Result Isn't What Everybody Expected, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at R3 ("A
lot of executives, especially below the CEO level, are under pressure from their financial
advisers to diversify and not keep all their assets in one company's stock." (quoting Paula
Todd, head of executive-compensation research and development at Towers Perrin));
Ruth Simon, Tax Strategies Aid Option Gains, Wall St.J.,June 28, 1999, at C1 ("An average
executive is going to have three-quarters of his wealth tied up in options .... Planning
around those options is essential." (quoting Arthur H. Kroll, a New York executive
compensation consultant)); Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 5 ("We have found.., that even
the most bullish executives are concerned about the lack of diversification in their
personal portfolio because of its high concentration in ESOs [employee stock options].");
cf. Ofek & Yermack, supra note 7, at 11-25 (demonstrating that desire for diversification
prompts executives to sell stock received from exercising options).
63. Especially for executives who have more wealth than they can consume, the
dispositive factor may not be financial. For example, some people especially value what
they earn through superior performance. See George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff,
Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. Behav. Decision Making 157, 158
(1994) (noting studies showing that people prefer to bet on their own judgments rather
than on chance devices with matched probabilities of winning). Such executives may not
want to hedge because profit would not come from their own efforts. Yet others may view
the decision to hedge itself as evidence of their good judgment.
64. State laws, such as New York's limits on short sales by certain corporate insiders,
may also impede hedging. See NY Penal Law § 190.35 ("A person is guilty of misconduct
by corporate official when... (2) Being a director or officer of a stock corporation... (b)
He sells, or agrees to sell, or is directly or indirectly interested in the sale of any share of
stock of such corporation, or in any agreement to sell the same, unless at the time of such
sale or agreement he is an actual owner of such share .... ). These rules are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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A. Existing Contractual Constraints on Hedging
Just as firms constrain exercise via contract, so too should they con-
strain options hedging. Nevertheless, direct contractual limits on options
hedging are relatively uncommon. Whereas the typical options plan bars
transfer or assignment of the option, it does not bar hedging (i.e., a sepa-
rate transaction in which a different option is sold).65 Firms that con-
strain hedging usually do so in "trading policies." Because these are sel-
dom disclosed to the public, 6 6 a detailed survey was not feasible.
According to practitioners, many firms do not have trading policies, and
among those that do, the policies typically cover only the most senior
executives and rarely cover basket hedging.
67
Although contracts rarely ban options hedging directly, they com-
monly contain another constraint that raises the transaction costs of op-
tion hedging, but would not necessarily stop the practice: Option plans
usually prevent executives from pledging their grants. This is significant
because, in hedging, executives usually have to pledge something of
value. The hedge requires the executive to trade future option gains for
protection from option losses. Since future gains are potentially infi-
nite-as the stock price can rise without limit-executives would have to
secure this potentially unlimited obligation. 68 Yet the option is not usa-
ble collateral. 69 Unless the executive has stock to pledge, she must offer
security, the value of which will not track her obligation (e.g., mutual
fund investments purchased with hedging proceeds). As a result, the
65. See, e.g., Boeing Co., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Apr. 27, 1998, app. A, at A-4 (options are "exercisable only by [the
employee who received the grant], and shall not be assignable or transferable by such
recipient").
66. For a rare exception, see Tetra Techs., Inc., Proxy Statement, May 17, 1999, at 13
("The insider trading policy also prohibits directors, officers and employees of the
Company from purchasing securities of the Company on margin or in short sales and from
buying and selling puts, calls or options involving securities of the Company (other than
employee stock options).").
67. See notes from interview with Barbara Nims, Davis Polk & Wardwell (Feb. 17,
1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (among firms that have considered the issue,
hedging restrictions are fairly common; yet many firms have not considered the issue);
notes from interview with George Spera, Shearman & Sterling (Jan. 27, 1999) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (many firms do not have trading policies that restrict hedging,
and some that do govern only the most senior executives); cf. Zurack et al., supra note 9, at
7 tbl.8 (pamphlet issued by Goldman Sachs on hedging employee options does not
mention contractual restrictions, presumably because they are not common).
Conversations with investment bankers familiar with efforts to develop options hedging
techniques confirm that contractual bans on options hedging are relatively uncommon
(except in the financial industry, perhaps because of their greater sophistication about
derivatives). These individuals declined to go on record.
68. Likewise, a pledge may be necessary if the executive wants to borrow against the
option's value.
69. See Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 7 (noting that option "will not likely serve as
usable collateral"). The contractual ban on pledging usually accompanies (or is subsumed
in) the ban on assigning the option grant.
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counterparty must monitor the relative value of the collateral and obliga-
tion, thereby adding to the hedge's cost, in some cases quite
considerably.
70
Since executives usually are not barred from pledging stock
purchased with their own funds, this constraint does not apply to stock
hedging. Nor is it common for firms to impose direct contractual con-
straints on stock hedging. Some firms do require certain senior execu-
tives to own a minimum amount of firm stock, but the applicability of
such constraints to hedging depends upon their precise wording. In any
event, the press has reported that such ownership guidelines often are
not enforced.
71
B. Existing Securities Law Constraints on Hedging
1. Disclosure Obligations. - Given the potential for reputational sanc-
tions, executives are less likely to hedge if they must disclose the transac-
tion. However, disclosure obligations are somewhat porous under cur-
rent law. 72 Until the mid-1990s, many believed there were no disclosure
obligations at all for derivatives transactions. Today, there still are no
disclosure obligations, to the firm or the market, for executives below the
rank of "insider"7 3 under section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. A 1996 SEC release clarified that insiders must disclose the most
70. As for other transaction costs, the investment bank's fee usually is not a barrier,
except insofar as it prevents executives from paying in cash for loss protection (i.e., buying
a put without selling a call). In addition, long-term options, necessary for hedges that last
several years, have recently become available. See Anthony J. Cetta, SIA Disagrees with
Coalition on Intermarket Coordination, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, Dec. 11, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 98 TNT 238-20 (reprinting letter to IRS
noting that the over-the-counter market offers hedges with terms of up to ten years).
Finally, an executive may be concerned about losing unvested options upon leaving the
firm. If options have appreciated since she hedged them, she will lose these appreciated
options upon leaving the firm, but will still owe a corresponding payment to her hedging
counterparty. Yet the executive can expect to land on her feet. If she leaves voluntarily,
her new employer may "gross her up" for options left behind. Even if she leaves
involuntarily, her severance package may protect her. See Murphy, supra note 20, at 16
(severance packages often include accelerated vesting provisions). In any event, executives
are more likely to be fired when the firm is faring poorly, so that the options would not
have appreciated and the profit, if any, would be in the hedge.
71. See Gogoi, supra note 62.
72. Obligations to disclose stock hedging are generally the same as those to disclose
options hedging.
73. Section 16(a) defines "insiders" as ten percent owners, directors, and "officers" of
the issuer. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994). Rule
16a-l (f) defines officers to include "an issuer's president, principal financial officer,
principal accounting officer [or controller], any vice-president ... in charge of a principal
business unit, division or function . . . , any other officer who performs a policy-making
function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the
issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (1999).
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straightforward hedges74-single-stock hedges whose value is explicitly
based on the employer's stock price.
Nevertheless, the press has reported a perception among derivatives
dealers and their advisors that the disclosure obligations for derivatives
are not always honored. 75 Surprisingly, even hedges that are disclosed
may not come to the market's attention. According to Professors Bettis,
Bizjak, and Lemmon, "[W]hen filed, [insider hedging] transactions ap-
pear only on Table II of Form 4 filed by insiders with the SEC. In gen-
eral, the services that provide insider trading data to the financial markets
(and others) do not make available the data needed to identify derivative
instrument hedging transactions.
'76
In this climate, aggressive insiders are unlikely to disclose if they can
find a plausible legal theory for this position. Basket hedges can supply
the desired argument. If the basket is broad-based, disclosure clearly is
not required. 77 What if the basket disproportionately represents the em-
ployer? For example, assume that a Proctor & Gamble executive enters
into a hedge based on a newly-created "consumer products industries of
Cincinnati" index in which Proctor & Gamble represents 90% of the in-
dex's value. A careful lawyer would recommend disclosure because the
hedge is economically close to a single-stock hedge-indeed, it insulates
the executive from firm-specific risk-and because the language of the
regulatory exemption, a "broad-based" index approved for trading, no
longer clearly applies. 78 Yet what if the index were defined so the em-
74. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-37260, 35-26524, reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg. 30,376,
30,387 (June 14, 1996) ("Section 16 consequences arise from an equity swap transaction
where either party to the transaction is a Section 16 insider with respect to a security to
which the swap agreement relates.").
75. See Ofeck & Yermack, supra note 7; see also Greg Ip, Collars Give Insiders Way to
Cut Risk, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at CI (indicating belief of official of a firm that
monitors insider sales that "the level of insider disclosure of such derivative transactions is
far below the actual level of insider activity").
76. Bettis et al., supra note 7, at 2; see also Simon, supra note 55, at CI ("Although
executives who are required to report 'insider' transactions ...also must report these
hedging transactions, the filings are often so complicated that it would be hard for an
average investor to figure out what's going on. As a result, these deals draw less attention
than an outright sale ...."); Deger, supra note 56 ("[A]ny disclosure [of hedging with
derivatives] is often done in an obscure or overlooked manner.").
77. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-37260, 35-26524, reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg. 30,376,
30,387 n.141 (June 14, 1996) ("[N]o Section 16 consequences would flow from an equity
swap to the extent that the equity swap relates solely to interests in securities comprising
part of a broad-based, publicly traded market basket or index of stocks.").
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (a) (5) ("The following interests are deemed not to
confer beneficial ownership for purposes of section 16 of the Act: . . .(iii) Interests in
securities comprising part of a broad-based, publicly traded market basket or index of
stocks, approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority."); 17
C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (c) (4) (excluding from definition of derivative securities "[iJ nterests in
broad-based index options, broad-based index futures, and broad-based publicly traded
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ployer represented only 70%? At some point, aggressive insiders (and
their aggressive counsel) will conclude that disclosure is not required, as
long as the hedge has been properly tweaked.79 In so concluding, they
may take comfort in the reality, fortunate for them only, that the SEC and
market are unlikely to learn of this transaction and thus will have no op-
portunity to challenge it.
2. Speculation and Short Positions: Section 16(c). - The most effective
securities law constraint on options hedging is section 16(c),80 but it, too,
is incomplete. Designed to prevent insider trading and to keep managers
from trying to depress their employer's stock price,8 ' this rule makes it
illegal for insiders to sell their employer's stock "short."82 However, the
statute disallows only short sales, without addressing derivatives that offer
comparable economic returns. Hedging with these derivatives is in fact
permitted by Rule 16c-4.
83
Even so, Rule 16c-4 does not necessarily bless options hedging
(although it clearly authorizes stock hedging). The SEC staff interprets
the rule to permit hedging only if the executive owns the stock itself, but
not derivatives such as options. For example, an insider can buy a put on
100 shares if she owns 100 shares, but not if she owns only an option to buy
market baskets of stocks approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental
authority").
79. For instance, in seeking to have this index approved for trading, the investment
bank counterparty on the hedge might offer regulators the seemingly innocuous (but
true) claim that Cincinnati-based investors are likely to be interested in the index.
80. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1994) ("It shall
be unlawful for any [insider] ... directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such
issuer... if the person selling the security or his principal... does not own the security
sold .... ."). Unlike section 16(b), which allows plaintiffs to bring civil suits, section 16(c)
outlaws the practice. See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings L.J. 391, 405 (1991) (contrasting
approaches of sections 16(b) and 16(c)).
81. Congress added section 16(c) in response to a widely publicized 1934 short sale by
Albert Wiggin, chairman of the board of Chase National Bank. According to Professor
Thel, Congress was responding to three concerns: Wiggin's access to inside information;
his ability to conceal his activities from the public; and his financial incentive to depress
the stock price. See Thel, supra note 80, at 428-29.
82. A short sale is a bet that the stock price will decline, implemented by selling
borrowed shares. The seller promises to return shares to the lender in the future, and
hopes declines in the stock price will make these "replacement" shares cheaper. See David
M. Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, 84 Tax Notes 345, 346 n.7 (1998).
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16c-4. Specifically, the rule allows "put equivalent position [s]"
(i.e., derivatives that appreciate as the stock price declines), but only "so long as the
amount of securities underlying the put equivalent position does not exceed the amount of
underlying securities otherwise owned." Id.
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100 shares.8 4 Nevertheless, aggressive insiders might be tempted to disre-
gard this interpretation because the SEC has not applied it in all cases.85
In any event, Rule 16c-4 does not expressly prevent insiders from
using basket hedges. The rule turns on the same standard that governs
disclosure,8 6 and an executive's calculus will be similar: Whereas the
favorable authority explicitly approves only broad-based baskets, aggres-
sive insiders might well use baskets that disproportionately represent
their employers, even if more conservative insiders would not do so. Ex-
ecutives below the rank of insider, moreover, are not subject to the rule.
As a result, the rule, by itself, would fail to block many instances of op-
tions hedging.
3. Section 16(b). - The "short swing profits" rule of section 16(b)
proves not to be a serious constraint here. In general, it allows the firm
to recover any profit the firm's insiders earn from buying and selling is-
suer stock within six months.8 7 Whereas hedging with a derivative gener-
ally would be treated as a "matchable" sale, an insider could avoid this
liability by not buying any stock8 8 within six months of hedging.8 9
84. This distinction, which transforms Rule 16c-4 into a barrier against options
hedging, was not meant to safeguard the incentive effects of options. Instead, the SEC
invoked congressional concerns about speculation:
The most abusive investment pools of the early 1930's (that involved short
selling) involved short selling of the stock while holding options to protect against
a price increase. In each pool mentioned in the legislative history, Congress was
quite concerned that the pool insiders would not exercise the option but would
instead repurchase the stock in the open market. This practice was viewed as
unethical. Based on this Congressional concern, no relief is proposed for short
selling against derivative securities.
Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors, and Principal Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-26333; 35-24768, 42 SEC Docket (CCH) 464, 486 (Dec. 2,
1988) (proposing and explaining Rule 16c-4) (internal footnote omitted).
85. For example, two recent SEC letters allow insiders to hedge even though they
hold convertible preferred stock (i.e., a derivative) instead of the underlying common.
The letters offer no reasoning to explain the departure from the SEC's usual view. See
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 407 (March 12,
1997); Time Warner, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 627 (Aug. 9, 1995).
86. Rule 16c-4 is triggered by a "put equivalent position," a phrase defined in the rules
on reporting obligations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l (h) ("The term 'put equivalent
position' shall mean a derivative security position that increases in value as the value of the
underlying equity decreases, including, but not limited to, a long put option and a short
call option position."). To have a "put equivalent position," one must have a "derivative
security position," see id., and this phrase is defined to exclude "[i]nterests in broad-based
index options, broad-based index futures, and broad-based publicly traded market baskets
of stocks approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority." See 17
C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (c) (4).
87. In both stock and options hedging, the question is the same: whether the hedge
can be matched with another transaction to trigger liability.
88. An executive can hedge within six months of receiving an option from the firm,
because the latter is not a matchable transaction if it satisfies certain criteria. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16b-3(d).
89. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be more daunting when
the executive "cash settles" the hedge (e.g., to avoid securities law constraints on delivering
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4. Material Information and Rule 10b-5. - All executives, including
noninsiders, will want to avoid liability for trading based on inside infor-
mation.90 Although this goal may delay a hedging transaction (e.g., until
after an earnings announcement), it will not necessarily stop it. An ex-
ception is when the hedge itself is material. Even so, very senior execu-
tives, whose hedging is most likely to be material, already are disclosing
single-stock hedges.9 1 The materiality of a basket hedge could be debata-
ble, on the theory that shareholders are not entitled to know the execu-
tive's private expectations about the market as a whole, as opposed to her
expectations about the firm. While this argument has less force for dis-
proportionate basket hedging, aggressive executives may consider it ade-
quate, given the low probability of public scrutiny of the hedge.
C. Summary of Existing Contractual and Securities Law Constraints
Whereas existing contractual and securities law constraints are suffi-
cient to block many instances of options hedging, they do not provide a
complete barrier. Except in the uncommon instance when a broad con-
tractual limit is in place, executives below the rank of insider are relatively
unconstrained. They do not have to disclose their hedges and generally
are free to engage even in single-stock option hedges, subject only to
transaction costs (e.g., arising from contractual constraints on pledg-
ing) .92 Insiders are relatively more constrained. They have to disclose
single-stock option hedges and are likely barred from them altogether
under the SEC's interpretation of Rule 16c-4. Nevertheless, insiders gen-
erally can avoid these constraints with a basket hedge, which is norma-
tively unobjectionable if the basket is broad-based. Yet aggressive insiders
might use a disproportionate "basket" that closely tracks their employers'
stock, such as the seller's obligation to deliver a prospectus or the buyer's required holding
period for privately-placed shares). Because cash settlement of a "short" derivative could
be viewed as a purchase, section 16(b) would be triggered if the executive sold stock within
six months of cash-settling a hedge. She might want to sell in order to raise money for cash
settlement. The executive might avoid liability by cash-settling with borrowed funds or
delaying settlement until she retires and is no longer an insider.
90. Application of this constraint should be the same for stock and options hedging.
91. Section 16(a) does not require disclosure until after the hedge is complete. See
supra note 57 (discussing requirements of section 16(a) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3). In
some circumstances, Rule lOb-5 may force the executive to accelerate disclosure.
92. This relative freedom might be justified on the theory that noninsiders have less
impact on the firm's performance. However, if the incentives of these executives truly are
not important, they should not receive large option grants. In fact, noninsiders are
receiving sizable grants. See, e.g., Helyar & Lublin, supra note 1, at BI (noting that by
1997, 35% of 350 major companies had option programs for all or a majority of workers
and that, for example, 1200 of General Electric Co.'s employees have stock options valued
at more than $1 million). While this phenomenon may evidence a pervasive flaw in
compensation practices, it could also suggest that incentives remain important at lower
levels. Either way, shareholders should object to hedging: Either the incentives of less




stock price. Thus, contractual and securities law constraints on options
hedging have potentially significant gaps. The gaps are even wider for
stock hedging: the pledging constraint does not operate and Rule 16c-4
expressly authorizes stock hedging. These constraints are summarized in
the following Table:
TABLE 5: CONTRACTUAL AND SECURITIES LAw CONSTRAINTS
Type Normative Assessment Effect of Barrier
Single-stock option Usually undesirable Insiders blocked; noninsiders permitted,
hedge subject to transaction cost from ban on
pledging ("pledging cost")
Disproportionate Usually undesirable Arguably permitted for insiders and
basket hedge permitted for noninsiders, in each case
subject to pledging cost
Broad-based Possibly desirable Permitted, subject to pledging cost
basket hedge
Stock hedge Less clear Permitted, subject to disclosure obligation
for insiders in some cases
IV. TAX DISINCENTIVES TO EXERCISE
This Part and Part V show the tax law's role in reinforcing contrac-
tual and securities law constraints on exercising and hedging. Although
Congress sometimes deliberately uses the tax code to pursue corporate
governance objectives, the tax constraints on exercising and hedging op-
tions do not fall in this category. Rather, the relevant tax rules were
meant to pursue tax policy goals, such as making the tax system more
administrable (e.g., by averting costly valuations) and defending the tax
base (e.g., by blocking certain tax-reduction strategies). In combination,
though, the rules generate a significant, if unintended, corporate govern-
ance effect. To develop this point, Section A begins with two measures-
the incentive stock option rules and section 162(m)'s exception for per-
formance-based pay-that arguably were intended to pursue corporate
governance goals. By themselves, these "deliberate" measures have not
been especially significant. Rather, as Section B shows, the most effective
tax constraint on exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called
nonqualified options, which were not fashioned with corporate govern-
ance in mind. Part V considers tax constraints on hedging, which are
daunting if the hedged asset is an option but not if it is stock.
A. Deliberate Tax Preferences for Options
Although Congress has offered two tax rules to promote the incen-
tive value of options, these deliberate efforts have had only limited signifi-
cance. First, Congress crafted a special category of options, "incentive"
stock options ("ISOs"), that offer the executive more favorable treatment
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than generic "nonqualified" options ("NQOs"). 93 Congress offered the
holder both a timing and a rate benefit, in effect treating an ISO more
like an investment than salary. An ISO is not taxed when exercised, as is
an NQO, and the ordinary income rate is not applied. Instead, the ISO is
taxed at lower capital gain rates,94 and the tax is deferred until the execu-
tive sells the stock received upon exercise.95 Apparently recognizing that
an ISO could not induce better managerial performance unless the exec-
utive kept it, Congress created an incentive to do so: Favorable tax treat-
ment is available only if the executive satisfies a holding period for both
the option and the stock acquired through it.96 Yet this inducement is
less relevant, and less effective, than it might appear. Incentive stock op-
dons represent only a small percentage of the typical senior executive's
compensation because the dollar value of annual ISO grants is strictly
limited.97 Nor is the tax burden on ISOs as low as it seems. The execu-
tive often owes alternative minimum tax ("AMT") upon exercising the
option. 9a Even if the executive still reaps tax savings after paying the
AMT, this savings can be more than offset by a high tax cost to the em-
ployer: The firm cannot deduct the cost of providing the ISO, as it can
for an NQO. As a result, if the executive and firm are subject to approxi-
mately the same tax rate, the firm can offer the executive more value, on
an after-tax basis, with NQOs than with ISOs.99
93. See Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of Incentive Stock Options-Turning
Employee Income Into Gold, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 500-01 (1983) (noting intended
incentive effect of ISOs). The tax rules for ISOs are in section 422 et seq. and the rules for
NQOs are in section 83. See I.R.C. §§ 422 et seq., 83. For a good summary, see Melton,
supra at 498-500.
94. Gain from a capital asset is eligible for a favorable rate-20% for stock and ISOs-
as long as the asset has been held for the requisite holding period (e.g., I year for common
stock). See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (defining long-term capital gain as gain from asset held more
than 1 year); I.R.C. § 1 (h) (1) (C) (designating 20% as maximum rate for long-term capital
gain on common stock). In contrast, 39.6% is the maximum rate on ordinary income of
individuals. See I.R.C. § I(a)-(d).
95. See I.R.C. § 421 (a) (1); Melton, supra note 93, at 500.
96. See I.R.C. § 422(a) (1); Barbara J. Raasch & Judith L. Rowland, Stock Option
Planning, 77 Taxes, 39, 41. It is also difficult to hedge ISOs. See infra Part V.E.
97. See I.R.C. § 422(d) (underlying stock cannot be worth more than $100,000 for
annual ISO grant).
98. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (3) (deeming ISO gains a preference subject to alternative
minimum tax); Raasch & Rowland, supra note 96, at 41. The AMT is a supplemental tax
that is supposed to ensure collection of a minimum amount of tax from all profitable
taxpayers: The tax applies to those who make excessive use of so-called "tax preferences,"
such as favorable depreciation methods, tax-exempt interest on certain bonds, etc. See
I.R.C. § 57. For a discussion, see generally Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and
Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 Taxes 91 (1988) (explaining the history
and rationale behind AMTs). For discussion of a congressional proposal to repeal the
AMT, see infra Part V.E. 1.
99. See Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Business Strategy: A
Planning Approach 187-90 (1992) (noting that NQOs can offer an executive the same
after-tax payment as ISOs at lower cost to the firm, as long as the firm and the executive are
subject to comparable tax rates).
20001
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:440
In addition to ISOs, another (arguably) deliberate tax preference for
option compensation lies in section 162(m). Although the rule generally
prevents firms from deducting annual compensation of key employees
above $1 million, 100 an exception is offered for certain compensation
"payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more perform-
ance goals."'0 1 Since Congress explained the limit as a way to reduce
executive compensation,10 2 the explosion of option grants is evidence
that the measure backfired (or was never intended to work). A more
charitable reading is that section 162(m) was supposed to promote options
(as well as other "performance compensation," such as bonuses based on
accounting earnings).' 0 3 As a preference for options, however, section
162(m) has a notable gap: It contains no unequivocal ban on selling or
hedging them. 1
0 4
B. Tax Disincentive to Exercise NQOs
Ironically, the tax law promotes the incentive value of options more
effectively through rules forged with hardly a thought to this issue: the
100. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (1).
101. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C). The legislative history suggests that this
performance-pay exception generally includes executive stock options. See H.R. Rep. No.
103-111, at 648 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 879 ("Stock options or other
stock appreciation rights generally are to be treated as meeting the exception for
performance-based compensation, provided that the requirements for independent
director and shareholder approval are met .). The options also may not be in-the-
money when granted. See id.
102. See id. at 877 ("Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate
executives has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The committee believes that
excessive compensation will be reduced [by the $1 million cap].").
103. Congressional hearings contained numerous endorsements of performance-
based pay. See, e.g., Executive Compensation: Hearings on S. 1298, H.R. 4727, and H.R.
5260 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. 5
(1992) ("Corporations need to inject performance, scrutiny, and disclosure into the
executive compensation equation. And if they refuse, we have an obligation to ensure that
tax policy or other public policy provides no comfort.") (Statement of Senator Baucus).
Likewise, a former Treasury official, Catherine Creech, said at a meeting of the D.C. Bar
that section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue-raising provision, but a behavior-
shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensation 'is not a
loophole.'"). Meegan M. Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive
Compensation Cap, 62 Tax Notes 747, 747 (1994).
104. The legislative history almost stumbles into conditioning the firm's deduction on
the absence of hedging by providing that "if an executive is otherwise protected from risk
of loss (such as through automatic repricing), the compensation is not performance-
based." See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, supra note 101, at 649. Even assuming legislative
history is authoritative, though, the taint seems to arise only if the firm, and not a third
party, supplies this loss protection. Although the firm's role is not an explicit condition, it
is implied by the automatic repricing example because only the firm can reprice its
options. In addition, the general principle elucidated by this language is that "stock-based
compensation"-a phrase that describes the arrangement with the firm, and not with third
parties-must not be "dependent on factors other than corporate performance." Id. at
648
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tax rules governing generic NQOs. Under these rules, the executive owes
no tax upon receiving the option and, correspondingly, the firm cannot
claim a deduction-even though a valuable right is being transferred.
10 5
Instead, tax consequences are deferred until the executive exercises the
option. At that point, the executive has ordinary income, and the firm
may take an ordinary deduction, based on the option's spread (i.e., the
difference between the stock's fair market value and the exercise
price) 106
This rule encourages the executive to keep the option instead of ex-
ercising it. By not exercising, the executive can defer the tax on her
profit from the option, thereby reducing the tax's real impact.10 7 This
tax deferral serves corporate governance purposes quite elegantly. 10 8
The executive is induced to remain exposed to the stock price. In con-
trast, if the executive were taxed upon receiving the option, regardless of
whether she exercised or sold it, she would have no tax incentive to keep
the option. 10 9
Nor is it costly for the tax system to supply this corporate governance
service. The reduced tax burden on the executive (from deferral of the
tax) is matched by an increased tax burden on the firm (from deferral of
the deduction). A special tax is thus imposed on the benefitting party. If
the firm and the executive have roughly equal tax rates, the treasury
comes out basically even.'
1 0
105. This is an exception to the general rule that receipt of property as compensation
generally is taxable. See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 864 (2d Cir. 1950).
106. Specifically, under Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a), an NQO is not taxed when granted if
it has no "readily ascertainable fair market value," for example, due to restrictions on
transferability. See § 1.83-7(b) (1) (1978) (options have "readily ascertainable" fair market
value within meaning of regulation if they are "actively traded on an established market");
§ 1.83-7(b)(2) (specifying four conditions that give nontraded options readily
ascertainable fair market value, including being transferable and immediately exercisable).
Instead, the option's "spread" is taxed as ordinary income upon exercise. See § 1.83-7(a)
("If section 83(a) does not apply to the grant of such an option .... sections 83(a) and
83(b) shall apply at the time the option is exercised . .. ."); I.R.C. § 83(a) (including in
gross income "the excess of ... the fair market value of such property ... over ... the
amount (if any) paid for such property").
107. Like an interest-free loan from the government, deferral of a tax allows a
taxpayer to continue to invest, and earn a return on, amounts that otherwise would fund
the tax. For a discussion of the tax-reducing effects of deferral, see generally David M.
Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549, 1555-63 (1998).
108. I do not mean to suggest that the tax law is uniquely able to achieve this function.
Contracts can do so as well, through slow vesting or awards that grow with the executive's
holding period. For a discussion of the relative merits of a tax-based solution, see infra
Part VI.
109. If immediate sales are barred by contract, the executive can become locked in
once the option has appreciated (assuming the appreciation is taxed under the realization
rule). See generally Schizer, supra note 107, at 1610-12 (describing lock-in under
realization rule).
110. The revenue effects of delaying exercise depend on whether the stock price rises
or falls after exercise, after which the issuer no longer can claim a deduction for
appreciation. See I.R.C. § 1032 (corporations have no gain or loss from transactions in
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Nevertheless, an executive's tax incentive to hold the option is not
unequivocal. Balanced against the "lock-in" described above is a counter-
vailing tax reason to exercise: The executive can reinvest in an asset that
yields capital gain, taxed at a lower rate."'1 The option, in contrast, yields
only ordinary income. 112 Of course, this switch is no blessing if the new
investment generates less valuable capital losses.'13 Yet if the option and
the alternative are each expected to appreciate, the tax law creates com-
peting incentives: Although exercising the option increases the execu-
tive's after-tax rate of return, it depletes her investment's size. As the fol-
lowing examples show, the tax incentive to keep the option is usually the
stronger one. Moreover, the tax incentive is reinforced by a nontax ad-
vantage of keeping the option: the ability to earn a return on the exer-
cise price before paying it. Ultimately, these incentives are not likely to
prevent exercise in all cases, but to discourage it in marginal ones. 114 In
a sense, they reinforce existing contractual restrictions on exercise, but
could not substitute for them.
1. Illustrative Examples. - Executives might exercise their options
and sell the stock for at least three reasons: to diversify; to finance con-
their stock and options). But the holder of the stock (e.g., the executive or her transferee)
would typically owe a 20% capital gains tax, leaving the government with 20% of the
appreciation. In contrast, if the stock declines after the exercise, the issuer will not have
taxable income and the holder will have a 20% capital loss.
111. Most passive investments, such as common stock, are capital assets. See I.R.C.
§ 1221 (defining capital asset).
112. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (providing for inclusion in gross income of person who
performed services). Accordingly, this tax incentive to keep an NQO is weaker than the
tax incentive, caused by the realization rule, to keep other appreciated assets. For a
discussion of the latter type of "lock-in," see Schizer, supra note 107, at 1610-12.
113. A capital loss is less valuable because, in general, it can be used only to avoid (the
lower) tax on capital gain, but not (the higher) tax on ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1211
(capital loss may not be deducted from ordinary income, subject to a maximum $3000
annual exception for individuals). In contrast, loss on the option is effectively ordinary
loss-or, to be precise, a reduction in ordinary income that otherwise would accrue upon
exercise. If option losses and gains are equally probable, there is no tax advantage to
exercising the option. The prospect of favored capital gains is balanced against the
prospect of disfavored capital losses. Cf. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the
Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It
Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377, 396-400 (1992) (under assumed conditions, the tax rate on
risk does not matter); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry,
Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731,
763 (1995) (same).
114. This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence. Professors Ofek and
Yermack have noted that executives tend to exercise fewer options than they would if
guided solely by a desire to diversify. Specifically, when they receive new grants (and thus
new exposure to firm-specific risk), executives do not exercise as many vested options (and
thus do not sell as many shares) as needed to cancel out this new exposure. See Ofek &




sumption; or to avoid expected losses.11 5 The tax disincentive is more
formidable in the first two scenarios than in the third.
a. Diversification. - Assume the executive has an option to buy one
share of EmployerCo stock at $50 and the stock is now trading at $150. If
she exercises the option and sells the stock at a $100 gain, she pays ap-
proximately $40 of tax and has $60 to reinvest in MutualFund. As Table 6
shows, this switch does not pay even if she expects a 14% return on Mutu-
alFund (taxable at the 20% capital gain rates) and only a 12% return on
EmployerCo stock (taxable at the 40% ordinary income rate). Exercising
the option reduces her investment in two ways: first, by the deferred tax;
second, by the exercise price.116
TABLE 6: NQO LoCK-IN AND DIVERSIFICATION
Amount Pre-tax Pre-tax After-tax
Investment Invested Return Amount Earned Tax Rate Tax Amount Earned
Mutual Fund 60 14% 8.40 20% 1.68 6.72
Option:
Exercise Price
Ignored 1 1 7  100 12% 12.00 40% 4.80 7.20
Option:
Exercise Price
Included1 1 8  150 12% 18 40% 7.20 10.80
To generalize with variables, assume the stock is trading at S and the
option's exercise price is E. The difference between these amounts, I, is
the option's intrinsic value (i.e., the profit that would be earned by exer-
cising the option). In other words, I + E = S. Assume that R and N are
the (positive) rates of return expected on the option and MutualFund,
respectively.
By exercising the option and selling the stock, the executive can ex-
tract the option's intrinsic value, L After taxes, she can reinvest .61 in
MutualFund. Her after-tax return will be .8N * .61 or .48NI. What if in-
stead she keeps the option? This analysis first considers the effects of tax
115. Motivations to exercise the option will resemble motivations to hedge it. For
discussions of the latter, see supra Part II.B.
116. The ability to "invest" the exercise price before parting with it gives the option
"time value." See supra Part I.A; see also Heath et al., supra note 7, at 603 ("premature
exercise sacrifices substantial value-on the order of 25 percent of the option's expected
value"). An offsetting consideration is that exercise allows the executive to share in
dividends, but dividend yields are at historic lows. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S.
Black, (Some of) the Essentials of Finance and Investment 238 (1993) (making the
common assumption, in discussing option valuation, that the option holder receives all
cash flows generated by underlying asset); Floyd Norris, Growing Number of Companies
Choose Not to Offer Dividends, N.Y. Times, January 4, 2000, at Al (describing "trend away
from dividends").
117. This computation isolates the effect of the tax law by assuming, counterfactually,
the executive is investing the $40 of deferred tax, but not the exercise price.
118. This computation adds in the effect of investing the exercise price, a benefit that
derives from the economics of options rather than the tax law.
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deferral, while ignoring the ability to invest the exercise price. The exec-
utive can invest the full I and her after-tax return will be .6*R*L Compar-
ing the two, we see that it pays to keep the option as long as:
.6R1 > .48NI, or
.6R > .48N, or
R > .8N.
The tax effect thus discourages exercise if the option's expected re-
turn is at least 4/5 as great as the return on the new investment.119
Once the exercise price is also considered, the effect is more power-
ful. The executive will invest I + E, and her after-tax return will be:
.6R(I + E).
It thus pays to keep the option1 20 as long as:
.6R(I + E) > .6 * .8NI, or
R (I + E) > .8NI.
Even if the option's expected return is less than 4/5 of the return on
the new investment, the return on the exercise price (RE) can make up
the shortfall.
b. Financing Consumption. - By increasing the option's return, tax-
deferral increases the opportunity cost of exercising it to finance con-
sumption. For example, exercising the above option would yield $60 af-
ter tax. But the opportunity cost is to forgo the 12% return (or 7.2%
after taxes), 12 1 not just on the $60 to be consumed, but also on the de-
ferred tax ($40) and the exercise price ($50). The opportunity cost rises
from $4.32 to $10.80.122
c. Expectation of Loss on Options. - When the executive expects de-
preciation on her option and appreciation on an alternative investment,
lock-in is weakest, though still a factor.1 23 By exercising the option, the
executive loses the ability to invest other people's money (i.e., the govern-
119. As a result, the executive should not exercise the option early if she intends to
keep the stock. Assuming she funds her tax on the option by reducing the size of her
position, which usually is the case, the executive would lose 40% of her position (or more if
her ability to invest the exercise price is considered). The increase in her rate of return
from .6R to .8R is too small to make up the shortfall. Instead of earning .6R1 from the
option, she will earn only .8*.6R/, or .48R1. See Raasch & Rowland, supra note 96, at 33;
see also Zurack et al., supra note 9, at 4.
120. To see how dramatic this effect is, assume that the exercise price is $100; the
stock is at $200; the expected return on the option is 10%; and the expected return on the
new investment is 20%. Even doubling the return does not justify a switch: .10(200) >
.8(.20)(100), or 20 > 16.
121. 6 * 12 = 7.2
122. In general terms, the opportunity cost of consuming the after-tax proceeds on
her option is not just .6R *.61, or .36RL Rather, it is .6R(I + E). In the above example,
12% of 60 is 7.20, or 4.32 after a 40% tax. Yet the return is earned not just on 60, but on
150 (i.e., 60 + 40 + 50). 12% of 150 is 18, or 10.80 after a 40% tax. While these numbers
represent the future value, the disparity would be comparable if the numbers were
discounted back to present value.
123. If she expects both to decline, switching is unappealing because losses would
become capital instead of ordinary. See supra note 113.
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ment's deferred tax and the employer's exercise price) at no interest 12 4
and with no obligation to pay it back if she loses it. Admittedly, this "non-
recourse loan" must be invested in the option, which is expected to de-
preciate. If this decline is uncertain or expected to be temporary,
though, the "loan" may be hard to give up.
2. Administrability Origin of Tax Barrier to Exercise. - While the tax
rules for NQOs can serve a corporate governance function by discourag-
ing an executive from exercising, these rules were not crafted with corpo-
rate governance in mind. Instead, the main concern was administrability.
For options to be taxed before they are exercised (e.g., on the grant
date), the system would have to value them. Such a timing rule would
invite self-serving taxpayer valuations (e.g., in which the firm's deduction
could exceed the employee's income from the same NQO).125 Thus,
Commissioner v. LoBue rejects a grant-date tax, advocated by Justice Harlan
in dissent, without mentioning corporate governance. 12 6 Rather, as Pro-
fessor Chirelstein has observed, the debate between majority and dissent
"appears to have turned on a question of fact, namely, whether the op-
tions granted to LoBue did, or didn't, have an ascertainable market value
at the date of grant." 2 7 As he notes, this valuation concern persists
under section 83, LoBue's statutory heir. 28 Yet, sometimes rules crafted
to address administrability concerns, such as valuation, can yield unin-
tended benefits. I have construed the realization rule in these terms.
129
124. For the tax deferral, she will never pay the government interest. For the exercise
price, she prepaid this "interest" through the option premium (i.e., the cash salary forgone
for the option). See Gilson & Black, supra note 116, at 239-40 (value of option includes
time value of keeping exercise price until maturity).
125. See Brookes D. Billman, Jr., Tax Mgmt. (BNA), Nonstatutory Stock Options
II.A.2.d (1996) (citing valuation and whipsaw concerns as rationale for not taxing option
when granted). While options valuation has become more sophisticated, the task is
difficult for NQOs because their term is uncertain, since the option may terminate if the
executive leaves the firm. This possibility also creates an "all events test"-type rationale for
not taxing the option. Until it vests, it arguably does not belong to the executive, and so
no tax should be imposed. Like the valuation rationale, the "all events test" rationale has
more to do with tax policy (e.g., administrability and fairness) than with corporate
governance.
126. 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Interestingly, the tax court offered the option's incentive effect as a reason not to tax it.
See Commissioner v. LoBue, 22 T.C. 440 (1994); see also Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F.2d
367, 371 (3d Cir. 1955) (upholding tax court's ruling on the same theory). Yet the tax
court was not trying to promote better corporate governance, but to measure income more
accurately. It was inappropriate to treat the option as income, the tax court said, since the
option was given for the employer's convenience. The Supreme Court properly rejected
this theory by observing that the option was not a gift and thus had to be income. See 351
U.S. at 247.
127. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 372 (8th ed. 1997).
128. See id. at 373. For the path from LoBue to the current regulations under section
83, see Billman, supra note 125, at II.A.2.d.
129. See Schizer, supra note 107, at 1552 (defending realization as a credible way to
reduce tax burden on investments). Realization is the rule that defers tax on appreciated
property until the property is sold.
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The tax disincentive to exercising options should also be viewed in this
light-in effect, as a corporate governance windfall. As Part V will show,
so too should the tax constraints on hedging.
V. TAX BARRIERS TO HEDGING
Part IV showed that the tax rules for NQOs serve a corporate govern-
ance function by discouraging executives from exercising options. Dis-
couraging exercise is only part of the battle. The other exit strategy,
hedging, must be at least as tax-expensive as exercise. That said, the con-
sequences do not have to be identical. The tax "pain" does not have to
be loss of deferral, as long as it is equally costly.
For options hedging, the tax system does indeed supply this
"pain"1 30 -not as a way to promote better corporate governance but,
rather, as a response to tax policy concerns. Section A outlines these con-
cerns. Sections B through D describe three adverse tax consequences
that can be triggered by options hedging: forgoing deferral of taxable
gain on the option; potentially indefinite deferral of loss on the hedge;
and a tax without a corresponding pretax profit, arising because a higher
tax rate applies to (ordinary) option gains than to offsetting hedging
(capital) losses. Section E discusses planning strategies to avoid these re-
sults. Whereas some nearly succeed, none do under current law. In con-
trast, Section F considers the less punitive tax treatment of stock hedging.
A. Tax Policy Origins of the Options-Hedging Barrier
Before turning to the specific tax provisions that deter options hedg-
ing, this Section previews two tax policies implemented by these rules,
each of which is far removed from corporate governance and managerial
incentives.1 3 ' First, Congress has sought to prevent taxpayers from gam-
ing the realization rule. Because this rule delays tax consequences until
the relevant property is sold, taxpayers control the timing of taxable gains
and losses. With this "timing option," they can minimize their overall tax
liability by selling depreciated property currently (and claiming a tax
loss) while retaining appreciated property (and deferring the taxable
gain).1 3 2 The timing option is especially potent when taxpayers take off-
setting positions, such as an asset and a hedge: Over time, one will inevi-
130. If enacted, a pending legislative proposal could significantly reduce this "pain."
For a discussion, see infra note 160.
131. Although the theory here is that the U.S. government is merely pursuing its usual
revenue-raising goals, without any interest in minimizing agency costs, the two objectives
are related. If a stock's price rises, the government generally shares in those gains by
taxing shareholders; if it falls, the government shares in the loss. Likewise, the government
loses revenue when executives substitute the nontaxable psychic benefits of shirking for
taxable NQO gains.
132. For a discussion, see George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with
Personal Tax, 51 Econometrica 611, 620, 622-23 (1983) (discussing timing option). See
also Schizer, supra note 107, at 1557-60 (same).
[Vol. 100:440
EXECUTIVES AND HEDGING
tably generate a currently deductible loss and the other a corresponding
deferred gain. Since such gaming could lead to significant loss of reve-
nue, the tax system regulates hedging with care-regardless of whether
the hedging could affect the incentives of corporate managers. Indeed,
this concern, and the rules addressing it, can apply not only to options
hedging, but also to stock hedging and, for that matter, inventory hedg-
ing, liability hedging, and the like.
13 3
Options hedging is singled out for particularly harsh treatment be-
cause, unlike stock hedging, it also implicates a second tax policy: the
system's interest in accounting separately for salary and "active" income
and loss, on the one hand, and investment returns and "passive" income
and loss, on the other. Various limitations can prevent taxpayers from
using investment losses to shelter salary income from tax.13 4 The point of
these limits is to ensure that tax is collected from wages and other active
income. However, such limits can have a harsh effect on a taxpayer with
salary income and an equal amount of investment loss: She could owe
tax even though, on a net basis, she has no economic profit. As discussed
below, this result is likely to arise when an executive hedges options. Op-
tion gain is treated as salary, which often cannot be sheltered by hedging
losses, as these usually are classified as investment loss. In contrast, this
problem does not arise for stock hedging because gains on stock are not
usually viewed as salary. To develop this contrast, the next four sections
describe tax rules that burden options hedging, and the final Section de-
scribes the relative ease of stock hedging.
B. Forgoing Deferral of Gain: Constructive Sale Rules
Of the tax risks associated with options hedging, the least daunting is
the risk of having immediately taxable income on the option. The execu-
tive can defer this tax by ensuring that the hedge is not treated as a sale
under case law135 or as a so-called "constructive sale," a statutory concept
introduced in 1997 to reinforce the realization rule by taxing hedging
transactions that sufficiently resemble a sale. 136 There is an unreality to
this inquiry, in a sense, since the hedge's very purpose is to simulate a sale.
Even so, "sales" and "constructive sales" are technical concepts, and a
hedge can be crafted not to qualify as either. Executives can avoid a sale
by keeping legal title to the option and the right to dispose of it.137 To
133. Provisions governing the timing option and hedging include the constructive
sale rule, see infra Part V.B; the capital loss limitation, see infra Part V.C.1; the straddle
rules, see infra Part V.C.2; and the hedging rules, see infra Part V.E.5.
134. These limits include the capital loss limitation, see infra Part V.C.1; the
investment interest rules, see infra Part V.E.2; and the passive loss rules, see Part V.E.3.
135. Under section 83, selling the option would trigger a tax, just as exercising it
would. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
136. See I.R.C. § 1259. For a discussion, see Schizer, supra note 82, at 345.
137. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 Taxes
783, 786-88 (1993) (properly crafted hedge of publicly traded assets not treated as sale);
see also Joint Comm. on Taxation, 105th Cong., General Explanation of Tax Legislation
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avoid a constructive sale,, the executive should transfer only some-and,
in the language of the legislative history, not "substantially all"-of the
option's economic return. 138 As I have written elsewhere, this standard,
which also governs stock hedging, leaves ample room for hedging.1
3 9
How much economic exposure must the executive keep? Regulatory gui-
dance from the Treasury is expected,' 40 since the statute does not offer a
quantitative test. As a rule of thumb,1 4 ' the New York State Bar Associa-
tion ("NYSBA") suggests a band of exposure equal to at least 20% of the
asset's value.
142
C. Tax Without Profit: Potentially Indefinite Deferral of Tax Losses
Options hedging can be deterred not only by accelerating tax on
gains, but also by deferring deduction of losses. The point of a hedge,
after all, is to cancel out changes in the option's value. If the option
depreciates by $100,000, the hedge must supply an offsetting $100,000 of
income. Likewise, if the option appreciates by $100,000, the hedge will
yield an offsetting $100,000 loss. What if, in the latter case, the executive
Enacted in 1997, at 172 (Comm. Print 1997) ("Under prior law [before constructive sale
rule was enacted], transactions designed to reduce or eliminate risk of loss on financial
assets generally did not cause realization.").
138. S. Rep. No. 105-33, at 126 (1997). Without retaining any exposure to an NQO's
return, executives still have a technical argument. Arguably, an asset can be the subject of
a constructive sale only if a sale would yield "gain," as opposed to income. See I.R.C.
§ 1259(a)(1) ("If there is a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position ... the
taxpayer shall recognize gain as if such position were sold .. "). NQOs yield only the
latter. See supra note 112. In my view, however, assets can be constructively sold even if
they yield ordinary income. The language about recognizing "gain" should be read to
describe the likely (but not exclusive) consequence of a constructive sale, as opposed to a
precondition.
139. See Schizer, supra note 82, at 345 (tax-free hedging can continue under section
1259).
140. See I.R.C. § 1259(f) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate
regulations); Senate Comm. Rep. on P.L. 105-34, reprinted in Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
31,130, at 56,712 (1999) ("It is anticipated that the Treasury regulations, when issued,
will provide specific standards for determining whether several common transactions will
be treated as constructive sales.").
141. The NYSBA's proposed safe harbor has two other requirements as well. First, the
band of exposure must include the current stock price. Second, the hedge must not last
more than five years. A problem with this "gross spread" approach is its indifference to
volatility. Keeping a 20% band is more meaningful for a nonvolatile utility than for a
volatile Internet stock, as the latter is more likely to trade outside that range. To account
for volatility, the NYSBA recommends use of options pricing to value retained exposure as
a proportion of total exposure. For a discussion, see Schizer, supra note 82, at 351. In the
interests of full disclosure, I was an author of the report offering these recommendations,
but they represent the organization's views.
142. For example, assume an executive holds options to purchase 10,000 shares for
$10 per share and the stock is now trading at $100. If the executive buys a put with an
exercise price of $100 and sells a call with an exercise price of $102, thus leaving herself
only a $2 band of exposure, she will have a constructive sale. On the other hand, under
the NYSBA's guideline, she avoids this result if her short call's exercise price is $120.
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cannot deduct this $100,000 loss? She will have $100,000 of additional
taxable income, and a $39,600 extra tax liability, with no pre-tax gains to
pay it. This loss deferral occurs only if the option appreciates, but not if it
depreciates, after the executive hedges. Under current law, two separate
regimes can trigger loss deferral: the capital loss limitations and straddle
rules.
1. Character Mismatch. - If the option appreciates after the executive
hedges, option gains will be ordinary, since they are deemed salary, and
corresponding hedging losses generally will be capital. 143 Because capital
losses cannot offset the tax on ordinary income, 144 the losses will be de-
ferred unless the executive has capital gains from other investments. For
example, assume an executive has options to buy 10,000 shares at $10,
and the stock is trading at $100. She enters into a collar that leaves her
exposed to price fluctuations between $90 and $110.145 Thus, her pre-tax
profit is guaranteed to be at least $800,000 and could be as high as $1
million. Yet as the table below shows, taxpayers who cannot use their
capital losses find this pre-tax gain eroded-indeed, it can turn into a
loss-as the stock appreciates.
146
TABLE 7: PRE-TAx PROFIT AND TAX BILL: 90-110 COLLAR ON OPTION
WITH $10 EXERCISE PRICE
Stock Price at Maturity 200 300
Stock Price at Time of Hedge 100 100
Net Pre-tax Profit 1 million 1 million
Taxable Income from Option 1.9 million 2.9 million
Deferred Capital Loss from Hedge 900,000 1.9 million
Current Tax Bill 752,400 1,148,400
After-tax Cash 247,600 (148,400)
143. Compare I.R.C. § 83(a) (ordinary character for compensatory option gains) with
I.R.C. § 1234A (losses on derivatives generally capital). See also Steinberg, supra note 57,
at 221-26 (losses are capital on forwards and collars). For discussion of swaps and
contingent debt, which generate ordinary losses, see infra Part V.E.1 & 2. For discussion of
a legislative proposal that would affect this analysis if enacted, see infra note 160.
144. See I.R.C. § 1211. For individuals, the modest sum of $3000 of capital loss can
offset ordinary income each year. Section 1211's purpose is to prevent taxpayers from
currently deducting investment losses while deferring inclusion of investment gains. See
Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations Under a
Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 677, 701, 701 n.53 (1993). The limitation
thus responds to the timing option and also defends the wage tax base.
145. The collar protects her from risk of loss by allowing her to sell for $90, but limits
her opportunity for gain by obligating her to sell for $110.
146. If the stock price rises to $200, she nets a $1 million pre-tax profit. In addition,
she has an extra $900,000 of ordinary income on the option and a corresponding $900,000
capital loss on the hedge. Yet she cannot use this loss to avoid tax on the ordinary income.
Assuming she does not have capital gains from another investment, her tax bill rises by
$356,400 (i.e., 39.6 * 900,000), making her total current tax bill ($752,400) more than
75% of her pre-tax profit. Moreover, if the price goes to $300, her almost $1.15 million
current tax bill will exceed her $1 million economic profit. See Table 7.
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This predicament arises in options hedging, but not stock hedging,
because option returns are classified as salary. In treating such gain as
salary, the tax law is consistent with the incentive rationale for granting
options, since the appreciation in the stock price is supposed to result
from, and reward, diligent service to the firm. However, it was not inevi-
table that the tax system would classify the entire return from an option
as salary, instead of merely its grant date value. In his LoBue dissent, Jus-
tice Harlan would have treated the grant date value as ordinary income,
while treating subsequent appreciation as capital. 147 If this position had
not foundered on the difficulty of accurate valuation, there would be no
character mismatch, and so the tax constraints on options hedging would
be far weaker, as are the tax constraints on stock hedging.
Given the path the law has taken, however, capital loss limitations
prove daunting. Capital loss on the hedge is potentially infinite, since it
grows with the employer's stock price. As a result, an executive cannot be
sure, ex ante, of having sufficient gains to use all her losses. She thus
bears a risk without any offsetting reward, because having capital gains
allows her, at most, to break even. 148 Even executives who expect to have
gain, moreover, could be forced to recognize it prematurely. If the exec-
utive would otherwise keep her appreciated capital asset for years after
her hedge matures-indeed, until she dies, so that her tax would be for-
given 149-hedging loss would shelter gain that, in effect, does not need
sheltering.
2. Straddle Rules. - Losses on the hedge may also be deferred by
another regime, the straddle rules of section 1092. A limit on the timing
option,150 the straddle rules prevent taxpayers who have straddles (i.e.,
two offsetting positions) from deducting a loss before recognizing gain in
147. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 251 (1956) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The option should be taxable as income when given, and any
subsequent gain through appreciation of the stock ... is attributable to the sale of a capital
asset and... should be taxed as a capital gain."). For a discussion of LoBue, see supra Part
IV.B.2.
148. Thus, as Professor Knoll has observed, hedging an ordinary asset with a capital
asset is like writing the government a free call option. See Michael S. Knoll, Hedging in an
Economy with Asymmetric Taxes: A Comment on Moshe Ayre Milevsky & Eliezer Z.
Prisman, Hedging and Pricing with Tax Law Uncertainty: Managing Under an Arkansas
Best Doctrine 6-7 U.S.C. Law School Working Paper Series No. 98-16 (1998) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
149. See I.R.C. § 1014 (basis in property acquired from a decedent generally is fair
market value on date of death); see generally Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46
Vand. L. Rev. 361, 371-75 (1993) (describing advantages to taxpayer of basis "step-up" at
death).
150. See Keyes, supra note 2, at 17-3 (describing abuse that prompted enactment of
section 1092). For a discussion of the timing option, see supra Part V.A.
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offsetting positions.1 51 As economically offsetting positions,152 the hedge
and option generally will be a straddle.' 53 Therefore, the executive can-
not deduct hedging losses before exercising the option.'
5 4
Even after exercising the hedged option, the executive still might
not be able to use hedging losses if she has other appreciated stock or
options-even if these others were never hedged. Such indefinite loss
deferral for so-called "unbalanced" straddles (i.e., hedges of less than all
the taxpayer's positions)155 follows from a literal application of section
1092(a): A taxpayer who hedges only one of her three shares, for exam-
ple, arguably may not deduct hedging losses before recognizing gain on
all three shares.' 5 6 Although Congress authorized regulatory relief for this
punitive result almost two decades ago, the Treasury has not yet provided
151. See § 1092(a) (1). The straddle rules also prevent a taxpayer from attaining the
long-term capital gains holding period in a straddle position if the holding period has not
already been attained before the position becomes part of a straddle. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1092(b)-2T (1986). The rules also capitalize certain interest incurred to purchase
or carry a straddle. See I.R.C. § 263(g). These effects are discussed below.
152. A broad-based basket hedge and option do not always offset each other (e.g.,
when the industry prospers but the firm fares poorly). As a result, it is arguable that a
broad-based basket hedge does not create a straddle with an option. See Steinberg, supra
note 57, at 243 n.111 (single stock hedged with put based on broad-based index may not
be straddle). On the other hand, a disproportionate basket hedge will create a straddle
with an option.
153. Although there is a technical argument that an options hedge does not create a
straddle, it is not persuasive. A straddle is defined as "offsetting positions with respect to
personal property," I.R.C. § 1092(c)(1), which in turn means that one position
"substantially diminish[es] risk of loss" in the other, I.R.C. § 1092(c) (2) (A). As a technical
matter, the hedge arguably does not reduce risk of "loss" in the option because "loss" is
defined as a capital loss, see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-5T (1986) (defining "loss" with
reference to section 165), and options generate ordinary rather than capital loss. Even so,
the executive does have risk of capital loss on the hedge, see supra note 143, which is
diminished by holding the option. Moreover, the definition of loss as capital loss purports
to apply only to certain regulatory provisions (i.e., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-iT
through 4T). Since the straddle definition is not among them, "loss" arguably is defined in
a nontechnical way for that purpose.
154. The executive might counter that losses are deferred only if she has
"unrecognized gain," I.R.C. § 1092 (a) (1) (A), and options generate "income" rather than
"gain." Yet such a technical reading of "gain," though plausible, is arguably inappropriate.
Whereas regulations define "loss" as a capital loss, see supra note 153, they do not offer an
equivalent definition of gain.
155. This issue could also arise in stock hedging, although taxpayers can avoid it
under current law through physical settlement of the hedge. See infra Part V.F.1.
156. Under I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1)(A), "[a]ny loss with respect to 1 or more positions
shall be taken into account for any taxable year only to the extent that the amount of such
loss exceeds the unrecognized gain (if any) with respect to 1 or more positions which were
offsetting positions with respect to 1 or more positions from which the loss arose." As long
as the two unhedged shares have "unrecognized gain," selling the hedged share arguably
does not release the loss. See Steinberg, supra note 57, at 246 (absent relief from the
Treasury, "most practitioners believe that ... the result [for unbalanced hedges] is that
none of the loss is currently deductible").
20001
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:440
it.15 7 There is a risk, then, that an executive cannot deduct hedging
losses before retiring. Until then, she will constantly receive new options
and thus will always have appreciated longs. To deflect this indefinite loss
deferral, executives might argue that Treasury's eighteen-year delay enti-
tes them to treat the statutorily-mandated regulatory relief as self-execut-
ing.158 A 1999 IRS letter ruling 15 9 supports this view. 160
157. See § 1092(c) (2) (B) ("If 1 or more positions offset only a portion of 1 or more
other positions, the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the method for determining
the portion of such other positions which is to be taken into account for purposes of this
section."); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199925044 (Feb. 3, 1999) (noting that such regulations
have not been issued).
158. Although deductions are usually viewed as a privilege rather than a right, see
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (deductions are a matter of
"legislative grace"), several authorities treat regulatory relief as self-executing when the
statute mandates it (e.g., by using the phrase "the Secretary shall," as in section
1092(c) (2) (B)) and the Treasury delays for an extended period. See, e.g., First Chicago
Corp. v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 180, 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1988) (in enacting minimum tax,
Congress ordered Secretary to propose a tax benefit rule; since Treasury had not "gotten
around to" this task, court allowed taxpayer to use tax benefit rule). Note, however, that in
First Chicago, the government conceded that the tax benefit rule was self-executing. See id.
at 184; see also, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819, 829
(1984) ("[T]he failure to promulgate the required regulations can hardly render the new
provisions of section 58(h) inoperative."); United States v. Deckelbaum, 784 F. Supp. 1206,
1207 n.3 (D. Md. 1992) (finding that when the Secretary has failed to promulgate
regulations, "the IRS must compute the tax which is due and owing as though regulations
had been issued"); Estate of Maddox v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 228, 234 (1989) (with
respect to section 2032A(g), which authorizes favorable estate tax valuation for certain
family farms, "the Secretary cannot deprive a taxpayer of rights which the Congress plainly
intended to confer simply by failing to promulgate the required regulations").
159. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199925044 (Feb. 3, 1999) (allowing taxpayer who was collaring
less than all her stock to identify which stock was a straddle with her collar, but noting that
the ruling "may not be used or cited as precedent"). Unlike a published ruling, a private
ruling technically may be invoked only by the party requesting it. Even so, the tax bar
frequently relies on private rulings in giving advice, as these are fairly good indicators of
the government's view of the law.
160. Although the tax barrier is effective in its current form, a serious risk is that
changes in the tax law will inadvertently undo it. As this Article goes to press, a legislative
proposal by the Treasury to modify the straddle rules ("the Proposal") could significantly
weaken the tax barrier. The Proposal's details have not yet been worked out and its
prospects for passage during this election year may prove slim. If it is enacted in its current
form, the Proposal would inadvertently enable executives to avoid the capital loss
limitations when hedging options. Under the Proposal, a loss from one leg of a straddle
would no longer be deferred but, instead, would be added to the basis of the other
straddle leg. See Treasury Explains Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals, Tax Analysts, Tax
Notes Today, Feb. 9, 2000, LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 2000 TNT 27-26 [hereinafter
Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals] ("[T]o appropriately match the timing of straddle
losses with related gains, the proposal would provide that loss recognized on one leg of a
straddle would be capitalized into the other leg of the straddle."). Thus, losses on an
options hedge would no longer be (potentially unusable) capital losses. Instead, they
would give the executive basis in the option-thereby serving to reduce ordinary income
earned on this asset.
Yet the executive could still have an unbalanced straddle problem. She would want
hedging losses to create basis in the option she was hedging, instead of another option, such
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D. Tax Without Profit: Asymmetric Rates
Even an executive who expects to have ample capital gains and is
willing to be aggressive about straddle loss deferral is not out of the
woods. An options hedge still cannot leave her indifferent, after taxes, to
subsequent changes in the stock price. To do so, the hedge must pro-
duce a dollar of after-tax gain for every dollar of after-tax loss on the op-
tion. In addition, it must produce a dollar of after-tax loss for every dollar
of after-tax gain on the option. Yet the hedge cannot satisfy both of these
conditions, because different tax rates govern option hedging losses and
gains. 161 Since the option and hedge are a straddle, gain on the hedge is
always short-term capital gain, generating a 39.6 cent tax for every dollar of
hedging gain. 1 62 In contrast, capital loss on the hedge will typically re-
duce long-term capital gain, thereby reducing the tax bill by only 20 cents
for every dollar of hedging loss. 163 As the following examples show, these
asymmetric rates force the executive to pick one of three unappealing
as a new grant. The Proposal would give a taxpayer no control over where the basis goes-
a retreat from the identification regime of Priv. Let. Rul. 199925044. Instead, the Proposal
apparently would require the new basis to be allocated, first, to positions with the most
built-in gain and, thereafter, pro rata to all positions. For example, assume an executive
has an option with an exercise price of $10 (the "old" option), and hedges it when the
stock price is $50. Sometime later, she gets another option with an exercise price of $100
(the "new" option). If the stock price rises to $300, she will have $250 of hedging loss.
While the first $50 would be allocated to the old option, only half of the remaining $200
would be allocated there, with the balance going to the new option. Thus, the executive
would still have $140 of ordinary income upon exercising the old option (i.e., $290 minus
the $150 basis), even though her pre-tax profit would be just $40. While the $100 of basis
allocated to the new option would reduce her income on it, she would not get a current
tax benefit from this basis if she were not yet ready to exercise this option. The prospect of
such timing mismatches could still deter options hedging, but the deterrent would be
considerably less daunting than under current law.
161. Although this issue can arise in stock hedging as well, taxpayers can avoid it
under current law through physical settlement of the hedge. See infra Part V.F.I.
162. A straddle leg cannot satisfy the long-term capital gains holding period as long as
it is part of a straddle, regardless of how long the taxpayer holds it. See Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1092(b)-2T (as amended in 1986) (holding period does not begin as long as property
is part of a straddle). Short-term capital gains rates are the same as those for ordinary
income. Cf. William A. Klein & Joseph Bankman, Federal Income Taxation 834 (11th ed.
1997) (after netting, only long-term capital gain is subject to preferential rate).
163. The executive would avoid this problem if her losses were reducing other short-
term capital gains in her portfolio, since her losses would then reduce her tax by 39.6 cents,
instead of 20 cents. Yet an executive will rarely expect to have sufficient short-term capital
gains in the year her hedge matures, let alone short-term gains that she otherwise would
recognize before satisfying the long-term holding period. On the other hand, the problem
is avoided if the executive can use her losses to reduce ordinary income on the option-a
course that is not available under current law but could become feasible under the
President's straddle proposals. See supra note 160. In other words, enactment of this
proposed legislation would alleviate an executive's asymmetric rate problem.
2000]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
outcomes: a net after-tax loss as the stock rises; a net loss as it falls; or a
smaller net loss in both cases.
1 64
1. Protection from Declines/Tax Cost from Increases. - The cost of break-
ing even as the stock price falls is after-tax loss as the stock price rises. For
example, assume an executive has 10,000 options to buy a share at $10.
After the stock has appreciated to $100, she enters into a "collar" on all
10,000 options, which leaves her exposed to price fluctuations between
$90 and $110. The following table shows that, as the stock price declines
below $90, every after-tax dollar of option loss will be offset by an after-tax
dollar of profit1 65 on her collar.1
6 6
TABLE 8: BREAKING EVEN As STOCK PRICE FALLS
Stock Price Option Pre- Option After- Collar Pre- Collar After- Net Profit on
at Maturity tax Profit tax Profit tax Profit tax Profit Both Positions
90 800,000 483,200 0 0 483,200
60 500,000 302,000 300,000 181,200 483,200
10 0 0 800,000 483,200 483,200
Yet, for every dollar the price rises above $110, the executive loses
19.6 cents after taxes. The reason is that a dollar of pre-tax profit on the
option is ordinary income that generates a 39.6 cent tax; a corresponding
dollar of capital loss on her collar reduces the tax bill by only 20 cents. 167
TABLE 9: 19.6% HEDGING TAX As STOCK RISES168
Maturity Option Pre- Option After- Collar Pre- Collar After- Net After-tax Compare
Stock Price tax Profit tax Profit tax Loss tax Loss Profit Profit at 110
110 1,000,000 604,000 0 0 604,000 n/a
111 1,010,000 610,040 (10,000) (8000) 602,040 (1960)
210 2,000,000 1,208,000 (1,000,000) (800,000) 408,000 (196,000)
410 4,000,000 2,416,000 (3,000,000) (2,400,000) 16,000 (588,000)
164. Nor does the executive's counterparty have correspondingly favorable treatment
(such as ordinary losses and long-term capital gains). Cf. Bradford, supra note 113, at 737
(tax base is protected as long as favorable tax treatment to one party is offset by
unfavorable treatment to counterparty). If the counterparty is a dealer in securities, as is
likely, it has ordinary income or loss under mark-to-market accounting. See I.R.C. § 475.
165. She makes a profit on the collar as the price declines because the collar allows
her to sell the stock for $90. For example, if the stock is worth $60, the right to sell it for
$90 has intrinsic value of $30.
166. A perfect offset is possible because the same tax rate applies to ordinary income
on the option and to short-term capital gain on the hedge. See supra note 162. For every
dollar that the stock price falls below $90, the executive loses a dollar of ordinary income
per option (and 60.4 cents after taxes) and replaces it with a dollar of short-term capital
gain on her collar (and thus 60.4 cents after taxes).
167. This calculation assumes the loss is reducing long-term-rather than short-
term-capital gains.
168. Another measure of hedging cost is the financial instrument an executive must
buy to break even as the stock price rises. She would need an additional 1960 call options
to earn an extra 19.6 cents after taxes for every dollar of increase in the stock price above
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2. Exposure to Declines/No Net Cost from Increases. - To avoid after-tax
losses as the stock price rises, the executive can hedge less than all of her
position: 7550 options, instead of the full 10,000.169 Whereas the hedge
will still generate a tax cost as the stock price rises, appreciation in the
2450 unhedged options offsets this cost. The price of breaking even,
though, is that 2450 options remain unhedged. As Table 10 shows, the
unhedged options will generate after-tax loss as the stock price falls.
TABLE 10: INCOMPLETE PROTECTION FROM DECLINES
Collar Pre-
Option Option tax Profit Collar Net Profit
Maturity Pre-tax After-tax (on 7550 After-tax on Both Compare
Stock Price Profit Profit Options) Profit Positions Profit at 90
90 800,000 483,200 0 0 483,200 n/a
60 500,000 302,000 226,500 136,806 438,806 (44,394)
10 0 0 604,000 364,816 364,816 (118,384)
Although the executive is incompletely protected as the price de-
clines, Table 11 shows that she breaks even as the price rises.
170
TABLE 11: BREAKING EVEN As PRICE RISES
Collar Pre-tax Collar After-tax
Stock Price Option Pre- Option After- Loss (on 7550 Loss (on 7550 Net After-tax
at Maturity tax Profit tax Profit options) options) Profit
110 1,000,000 604,000 0 0 604,000
111 1,010,000 610,040 (7550) (6040) 604,000
210 2,000,000 1,208,000 (755,000) (604,000) 604,000
410 4,000,000 2,416,000 (2.265 million) (1.812 million) 604,000
$110. (This calculation assumes she could use existing capital losses to shelter tax on these
new calls.)
169. This number is computed as follows:
Let X the number of hedged options.
Let Y = the number of unhedged options.
Since they sum to 10,000, X + Y = 10,000.






X = 10,000 - Y = 7550.
170. The loss is 14.8 cents per share for every dollar decrease in the stock price.
Because 2450 of the 10,000 options-or .245 of the position-are unhedged, each dollar
decline costs the tax payer 24.5 cents per share on a pre-tax basis. Since the tax rate is
39.6%, the tax payer bears only 60.4% of this loss, or 14.8 cents (i.e., .604 * 24.5). Thus, to
break even as the price falls, the executive must buy puts that generate 14.8 cents per share
after taxes for every dollar of declines below $90. Assuming this gain is taxable short-term
capital gain (since her other positions do not generate capital loss to shelter it), she will
need 2450 puts (i.e., 24.5 * 60.4 = 14.8). In other words, she will have to hedge the
unhedged options.
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3. Partial Exposure to Declines and Increases. - Instead of having losses
either as the price declines or as it rises, the executive can spread her
losses between the two scenarios. For example, she can leave 1225 op-
tions unhedged, instead of 2450. As a result, she halves her losses as the
price falls below $90, at the cost of 9.8 cents for every dollar of increase
above $110.
TABLE 12: LOSSES FROM DECLINES
Collar Pre-
Option Option tax Profit Collar Net Profit
Maturity Pre-tax After-tax (on 8775 After-tax on Both Compare
Stock Price Profit Profit Options) Profit Positions Profit at 90
90 800,000 483,200 0 0 483,200 n/a
60 500,000 302,000 263,250 159,003 461,003 (22,197)
10 0 0 702,000 424,008 424,008 (59,192)
TABLE 13: LOSSES FROM INCREASES
Option Option Collar Pre- Collar Compare
Maturity Pre-tax After-tax tax Loss on After-tax Net After- Profit at
Stock Price Profit Profit 8775 Options Loss tax Profit 110
110 1,000,000 604,000 0 0 604,000 n/a
111 1,010,000 610,040 (8775) (7020) 603,020 (980)
210 2,000,000 1,208,000 (877,500) (702,000) 506,000 (98,000)
410 4,000,000 2,416,000 (2,632,500) (2,106,000) 310,000 (294,000)
E. Planning Around Tax-Without-Profit Effects: Seeking Ordinary Treatment
on the Hedge
Whereas the constructive sale rules and straddle loss deferral proba-
bly can be avoided, the character mismatch and asymmetric tax rates are
more daunting for options hedging. This Section shows that some plan-
ning strategies almost counteract them, but none succeed under current
law. The objective of each of these strategies is for the return on the
options hedge to be ordinary, instead of capital. As a result, there would
no longer be a mismatch with the option's ordinary return. Likewise,
differences between the short- and long-term capital gains rates would
become irrelevant, as would the straddle rules' effect on holding period.
With the following six strategies, the hedge's return would be ordinary.
Nevertheless, other tax costs render these strategies unusable under cur-
rent law.1 71 Even so, the tax law is constantly changing, and tax lawyers
171. An alternative way of avoiding the character mismatch is not to make the hedge's
character ordinary, but rather to make the incentive compensation's character capital.
There are two instances when this occurs. The first, a so-called "section 83(b) election," is
not available for options. It is considered in the discussion of stock hedging at infra Part
V.F.2. The second type of incentive compensation that generates capital gain is an
incentive stock option. Unfortunately for the executive, however, hedging an ISO turns it
into an NQO, effectively eliminating this avenue. For the option to qualify as an ISO, the
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are a creative group. As Professor Ginsburg has observed, "[t] he tax bar
is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given the
chance, those people will do you in."1 72 Today's tax barrier may be gone
tomorrow.
1. Swaps. - Although the tax character of swap 173 payments is not
settled, ordinary treatment is likely for certain swaps.174 Nevertheless,
hedging with swaps bears two severe tax costs, each following from the
fact that swap expenses are "miscellaneous itemized deductions." 175 First,
these losses are not deductible unless, together with the executive's other
miscellaneous itemized deductions, they exceed 2% of her adjusted gross
income for the year.1 76 More importantly, ordinary swap losses offer no
deduction under the AMT. 177 An executive with sizable options income,
offset by an equal amount of swap expenses, computes her AMT based
executive most retain it-and the stock acquired from exercising it-for a requisite
holding period without making a "disposition." See I.R.C. § 422(a)(1). The government
has construed the term "disposition" broadly to include hedging. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-92,
1973-1 C.B. 208 (treating an executive as making a disqualifying disposition by shorting
stock while holding identical stock acquired through a qualified option). Hedging would
also eliminate the holding period under the straddle rules. See Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1092(b)-2T(a) (as amended in 1986) (holding period does not begin as long as
position is part of straddle). The executive cannot avoid these results by holding the ISO
for a minimum period before hedging, since she still will not have satisfied the holding
period for the stock.
172. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg) (quoted in Erik M.
Jensen, The Heroic Nature of Tax Lawyers, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 367, 372 (1991)).
173. For a definition of a swap, see supra note 4.
174. Ordinary treatment is more likely if the swap uses annual payments, instead of a
single payment at maturity, to account for gains and losses in the underlying property. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9730007 (Apr. 10, 1997) (ruling that ordinary treatment is required for
swaps that settle gains and losses with periodic payments, on theory that such payments are
not in connection with "sale" or "termination" of capital asset); see also New York State Bar
Association Tax Section, Notional Principal Contract Character and Timing Issues,
reprinted in 79 Tax Notes 1303, 1305-11 (1998) [hereinafter NYSBA Swap Report] (IRS
ruling treating swap payments as ordinary may not apply to swap using single payment at
maturity). Yet use of annual payments has two disadvantages. First, the executive may face
a liquidity crunch. If the stock price rises, she will owe a swap payment but may not have
cash to pay it (e.g., if she is not yet ready to exercise her option). In addition, the
executive may lose the advantages of tax deferral. If the stock price falls, the payment she
receives is immediately taxable.
175. These are a special class of disfavored itemized deductions, which are not
excluded from "miscellaneous" status by section 67(b). The deduction under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-3 (1994) for swaps is usually considered an expense for the production of income
under section 212. Such expenses are not excluded by section 67(b).
176. See Steinberg, supra note 57, at 230 (swap expense subject to 2% limitation).
For example, if her adjusted gross income is $250,000 and she makes a $50,000 payment,
she loses $5,000 of the deduction.
177. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (1) (disallowing deduction of miscellaneous itemized
deductions in computation of alternative minimum taxable income); Steinberg, supra note
57, at 230. For a discussion of the AMT, see supra note 98.
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only on the income. As a result, she will owe a 28% tax on the income
even though she has no economic profit.
178
This tax barrier largely depends on the AMT, which has come under
fire in recent months. Critics observe that the tax, which originally
targeted wealthy taxpayers, now frequently applies to large middle-class
families, merely because they have many dependents. 179 Not surprisingly,
House Republicans have proposed to scale back and, ultimately, to repeal
the AMT. 180 This measure was not enacted in 1999, when Chairman
Archer proposed it. If it ever is enacted, option hedging will no longer
trigger a significant tax without economic profit.
2. Contingent Debt. - Another way to generate ordinary hedging
losses is to embed the hedge in a debt instrument by borrowing money
and basing the interest obligation on the employer's stock price. l81 How-
ever, although interest on contingent debt usually gives rise to an ordi-
nary deduction, 182 the so-called investment interest rules severely limit
the deduction. Not targeted at corporate governance, this limitation
aims at "tax arbitrage" in which taxpayers borrow money (and deduct
178. See I.R.C. § 55(b) (1) (A) (i) (II) (tentative tax for noncorporate taxpayers is 28%
of so much of the taxable excess as exceeds $175,000).
179. See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, The Crazy Politics of the Alternative Minimum Tax, 82
Tax Notes 1867, 1867-68 (1999).
180. The proposal, offered by Chairman Archer of the Ways and Means Committee,
would impose only 80% of AMT liability in 2003, 70% in 2004, 60% in 2005, 50% in 2006
and 2007, and would repeal the AMT entirely for tax years after 2007. See H.R. Doc. No.
2488, at 11 (1999) (describing the Archer proposal). The more moderate proposal of
Senator Roth, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, would preserve the AMT but
provide a full AMT deduction for personal exemptions. See S. Rep. No. 106-120, at 14
(1999). President Clinton has also proposed a modest approach aimed at helping
ameliorate the AMT's impact on families with children. See David CayJohnston, Clinton
Acts to Change Levy That Affects Middle Class, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2000, at C2.
181. Professor Knoll has observed this tax advantage of contingent debt as a hedge for
business risks. See Knoll, supra note 148, at 2. For example, assume the employer's stock is
trading at $100 and the executive has options to buy 10,000 shares at $10, which have
$900,000 of intrinsic value. She can buy a put which allows her to sell the stock for $90, so
that she locks in $800,000 of gain. To pay for this put, instead of selling a call (at, say,
$110), she can borrow money and structure her interest payments so that they are, in
effect, a short call. Thus she borrows $900,000 and, when the loan matures, she must
return this principal amount plus, as interest, the amount by which the value of 10,000
shares exceeds $1.1 million. If the stock is trading at $210 at maturity, she will owe $1
million of interest. If the stock is trading at $90, in contrast, she will not owe any. Note
that the put must be separate from the debt. If it is embedded in the debt (i.e., so that the
principal amount declines with the stock price), the instrument is unlikely to qualify as
debt for tax purposes-and thus will not generate ordinary deductions.
182. Under the "noncontingent bond method" of Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (1997), this
interest is deductible, subject to the investment interest limitation described in the text.
Unless such a limitation applies, the deduction is not delayed until the executive makes the
payment. Instead, she takes an annual deduction based on her usual borrowing cost (the
.comparable yield"). When the debt instrument matures, she adjusts her income in that
year (i.e., with inclusions or additional deductions) to rectify any divergence between prior
deductions and her actual payment.
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interest) to buy assets that yield a tax-exempt or a tax-deferred return. 8 3
In response, Congress allows a deduction of "investment interest" only up
to the amount of a taxpayer's "investment income" (e.g., taxable interest
and dividends). 8 4 Such interest may not be used to shelter salary in-
come from tax. On the equity-linked debt described above, then, the
executive cannot deduct interest (including payments based on apprecia-
tion in the underlying stock's value) except to the extent of her invest-
ment income. This amount does not include her option gain, which is
considered salary.' 85 As a result, the executive may owe tax without hav-
ing any profit, since her option income can be matched by nondeduct-
ible investment interest.
While executives have a strained technical argument to avoid this
limitation, at least for deductions claimed when the bond matures, 186 the
"solution" creates a new problem. The contingent debt rules treat ex-
pense at maturity as a "loss" for purposes of the straddle rules, if the debt
is part of a straddle.' 8 7 Does this regulation render the payment a
"loss"-as opposed to "interest"-for other purposes as well? If it does-
and, in my view, this reading is plausible but probably not correct' 8 8-the
maturity payment would no longer be "interest" subject to the investment
183. See Chirelstein, supra note 127, at 139 (explaining investment interest rules as
response to tax arbitrage).
184. See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (investment interest may not be deducted to the extent it
exceeds net investment income). Disallowed deductions may be carried forward to
subsequent tax years. See I.R.C. § 163(d) (2).
185. Salary income is not included in the two statutory classes of "investment income":
"gross income from property held for investment" and "net gain attributable to the
disposition of property." I.R.C. § 163(d) (4) (B).
186. Specifically, the argument applies to the so-called "positive adjustment," which is
an additional deduction for the amount by which the payment at maturity exceeds the tax
law's prediction, as of the issue date, of what this payment would be. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1275-4(b) (6) (1997) (discussing positive and negative adjustments). This predicted
amount (the so-called "projected payment schedule"), which is based on the issuer's usual
borrowing cost, has already been deducted (i.e., through the issuer's annual deduction for
the "comparable yield"). See supra note 182 (discussing use of comparable yield in
noncontingent bond method).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.12754(b)(9)(vi) ("[A]n issuer treats a positive adjustment as a
loss with respect to a position in a straddle if the debt instrument is a position in a
straddle .... ").
188. By its terms, the language creates a consequence only under the straddle rules
(i.e., in deeming the expense "a loss with respect to a position in a straddle"). Id. It is
possible that in covering this payment under one loss deferral regime (i.e., the straddle
rules), the Treasury meant to exempt it from another (i.e., the investment interest rules).
However, it is also possible that both regimes are meant to apply. The latter reading is
more plausible because a rule with clear a punitive consequence (loss deferral under the
straddle rule) should not be viewed as bearing a blessing in disguise (exemption from the
investment interest rules), at least absent a clearer indication that this generous result was
intended.
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interest limits. However, as a "loss," it would be a miscellaneous itemized
deduction t89 that is not deductible under the AMT. 190
3. Mark-to-Market Election for Securities Traders. - If the executive
qualifies as a "securities trader" under section 475(f), she can elect ordi-
nary treatment for all her "trading" securities, including her hedge. 191
However, even if she is eligible for the election, 92 which is unlikely, the
strategy is too costly. All of her other securities would be treated as ordi-
nary property and marked to market, except those plausibly identified as
189. Not all "losses" are miscellaneous itemized deductions. Indeed, losses from the
"sale or exchange of property" are accorded favorable above-the-line status (i.e., they are
used to compute adjusted gross income). See I.R.C. § 62(a)(3) (granting deduction for
losses from sale or exchange of property). Yet the loss here results from terminating an
obligation, not from selling property. Whereas section 1234A treats certain terminations
as if they were a sale or exchange of property, it explicitly excludes retirement of debt. See
I.R.C. § 1234A ("The preceding sentence shall not apply to the retirement of any debt
instrument . . . ."). Assuming the loss is not interest, no deduction would be available
under section 163. See I.R.C. § 163 (authorizing deduction for interest). The statutory
basis for a deduction, then, is likely to be as an expense for production of income under
section 212. Such expenses clearly are miscellaneous itemized deductions. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.67-IT(a) (1) (ii) (as amended in 1988) (noting that expenses under section
212 are miscellaneous itemized deductions).
However, the need for an unrestricted deduction would fade if the President's
straddle proposal is enacted. See supra note 160. As straddle loss, the interest expense
apparently would be capitalized into the basis of a straddle leg, instead of being separately
deducted. As long as this expense is capitalized into the basis of the compensatory
option-and not the put held by the executive-the hedging loss would offset ordinary
income.
190. Compare supra Part V.E.1 (noting that swap expense is a miscellaneous itemized
deduction that is nondeductible under the AMT). In addition, still another loss deferral
regime can apply, in this case to the "comparable yield" interest deduction otherwise
generated before the loan matures. If this interest is incurred to "carry" a straddle, the
deduction is disallowed. Instead, the interest is added to the basis of a leg of the straddle.
See I.R.C. § 263(g) (1) (requiring capitalization of "interest and carrying charges properly
allocable to personal property which is part of a straddle"); see also Clinton Budget
Revenue Proposals, supra note 160 (proposing to eliminate "purchase or carry" test, so that
interest would automatically be capitalized for "straddle-related debt"). If added to the
NQO's basis, the interest expense reduces ordinary income, thereby averting any character
mismatch. If added to the basis of the put, however, the expense generates capital loss and
thus a mismatch.
191. See I.R.C. § 475(0; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(f)-2(b), 64 Fed. Reg. 4374, 4378
(1999).
192. To be eligible, the executive must have an active business of trading securities in
which she constantly places short-term bets. See Liang v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1040,
1043 (1955) (traditional mark of a "trader" is that "securities are bought and sold with
reasonable frequency in an endeavor to catch the swings in the daily market movements
and profit thereby on a short-term basis"); see also Daniel S. Shapiro, Private Securities
Partnerships-The Trade or Business Issue Examined, 56 Tax Notes 85, 92-102 (1992)
(describing judicially developed tests for determining whether a securities partnership is
engaged in the trade or business of securities trading). This showing is difficult for
someone who has a full-time occupation unrelated to such trading.
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unrelated to the "trading business."193 Thus, she would lose the advan-
tages of deferral for her appreciated assets.' 94 This result may prove
more tax-expensive than simply exercising the option.
To mark only her hedge to market, and not her other positions, the
executive might form a partnership that enters into the hedge and elects
to mark its positions to market.195 Yet this election is available only if
securities trading is the partnership's "trade or business."19 6 This status is
probably unavailable because it requires frequent short-term bets, as op-
posed to one long-term short position on one stock.' 9 7 Even if the
"trader" election were available, moreover, the passive loss rules' 98 gener-
ally would prevent partnership hedging losses from offsetting the execu-
tive's "active" option income. 199
4. Physically-Settled Derivatives. - The main problem with options
hedging is that the hedge generates losses that, after taxes, may not fully
193. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(f)-2(a)(4), 64 Fed. Reg. 4374, 4378 (1999)
(securities not identified as investment securities are marked to market and gains and
losses are ordinary in character). For the identification to succeed, the trader must
"demonstrat[e] by clear and convincing evidence that a security has no connection to its
trading activities." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(f)-2(a) (2), 64 Fed. Reg. 4374, 4378 (1999).
194. Since she would want mark-to-market treatment for her hedge (in order to get
ordinary character), the executive could have to settle for mark-to-market treatment for
the option. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(f)-2(a)(3), 64 Fed. Reg. 4374, 4378 (1999)
(securities that are substantially similar generally must be marked to market if at least one
has been treated as a "trading" security, but an exception may be available if "the security is
held in a separate, nontrading account maintained with a third party").
195. The partnership, as opposed to the partners, elects the partnership's method of
accounting, but the choice "shall not apply to any partner's nonpartnership interests." See
Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b) (as amended in 1992). Thus, a section 475(f) election, if
successful, gives the executive mark-to-market and ordinary treatment on any positions in
the partnership (i.e., the hedge) but not on any of the positions outside the partnership
(i.e., the option and other investments).
196. See I.R.C. § 475(f) (offering election to "a person who is engaged in a trade or
business as a trader in securities").
197. To seem more like a trader, the partnership might supplement the hedge with
other positions, but this defeats the purpose of using the partnership (i.e., avoiding mark-
to-market accounting for other positions).
198. The passive loss rules keep taxpayers from reducing their wage income with
'passive activity losses," i.e., losses from activities in which they do not "materially
participate." I.R.C. § 469(a)-(d); see generally Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive
Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 15,
16-24 (1989) (describing passive loss rules). Limited partners are presumed not to be
material participants. See I.R.C. § 469(h) (2). In any event, the executive is unlikely to
'participate materially" in implementation of the hedge. Executives might eventually use
the losses upon selling the partnership interest, but only if the sale is to an unrelated third
party. Assuming (as is likely) that an investment bank is the executive's partner, the
executive cannot sell her interest to the bank or the partnership. See I.R.C.
§ 469(g) (1) (B). Given the limited demand for such a partnership interest, the executive
probably cannot count on such a sale to release losses.
199. If the passive loss rules are not deterrent enough, the executive must also
consider application of the straddle rules, since option gains are economically offset by
hedging losses from the partnership.
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offset option gains (e.g., because of a mismatch in character and because
different tax rates apply to gains and losses).200 However, these problems
in using tax losses do not arise if the hedge, as a tax accounting matter,
directly caps the executive's taxable income instead of generating a sepa-
rate (potentially nondeductable) tax loss. For tax purposes, physically-
settled derivatives are treated as fixing a sale price, and thus capping the
amount realized on the underlying property. 201 For example, assume an
executive has an option to buy 10,000 shares for $10 per share. When the
underlying stock is at $100, such that the NQO has $900,000 of intrinsic
value, the executive might enter into a contract to sell the compensatory
option itself (a "physically-settled forward contract") for $900,000 in three
years. 202 Upon delivering the option, the executive has $900,000 of taxa-
ble option income, even if the option is worth considerably more. To use
this approach, however, the executive must actually deliver her NQOs-a
legal impossibility because they are not transferable.
20 3
5. Hedging Rules. - The hedging regulations of Treasury Regulation
section 1.1221-2 alleviate character mismatches in other contexts, such as
in the hedging of inventory. 20 4 If applicable, the regulations allow ordi-
nary treatment for hedging losses that otherwise would be capital.
205
Regulatory relief is unlikely here. It is available only for "hedging transac-
tions," defined as "a transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal
course of the taxpayer's trade or business primarily-(1) To reduce risk
of price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary prop-
200. See supra Part V.C & D.
201. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 57, at 222 (when a put option is physically settled,
no gain or loss is recognized on the put; gain or loss is recognized on underlying property,
based on put exercise price instead of underlying's fair market value); cf. id. at 248 n.125
(noting that taxpayers can use physically-settled derivatives to avoid "converting" long-term
gain to short-term gain on a straddle).
202. Although I use $900,000 in the text for the sake of simplicity, the price should be
higher because forward prices generally equal the spot price plus an amount based on time
value.
203. This analysis could change if the President's straddle proposals are enacted. See
supra note 160. In essence, physically settled options hedges would no longer have an
advantage over cash-settled ones, but the latter would become more feasible. Specifically,
under the straddle rules, physical settlement would no longer cap the gain recognized on
the hedged asset without generating a separate loss. Instead, loss would be recognized as if
the hedge were cash-settled. Then, some portion of this loss would be capitalized into the
basis of the property being delivered, which would be treated as sold for fair market value.
See Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals, supra note 160 (proposing to "ensure that the
straddle rules are not circumvented in situations where a leg of the straddle is physically
settled"). This hedging loss would be capitalized into the basis, not only of the asset that is
delivered upon physical settlement, but also into the basis of assets that are retained. Since
this basis would not reduce the executive's tax liability until she sold these assets, the
executive would face a timing mismatch. Thus, physical settlement would no longer be a
solution to the unbalanced straddle problem discussed supra in Part V.C.2.
204. For a discussion of the problem that inspired the regulations, see Edward D.
Kleinbard & Suzanne F. Greenberg, Business Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 Tax L. Rev.
393, 414-40 (1988).
205. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(a) (1996).
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erty ... that is held or to be held by the taxpayer." 20 6 Even if the execu-
tive is hedging "price changes"-a phrase that seems more applicable to
inventory or raw materials than to equity compensation-she is not hedg-
ing "in the normal course of [her] trade or business." The hedging obvi-
ously is not a work responsibility, since it is not even in the employer's
interest.
20 7
6. Hedge Provided by Employer. - If the employer were to supply the
hedge as compensation, the hedge would yield an ordinary return and
thus would not trigger the capital loss limitations or asymmetric tax
rates.20 8 Employers should be reluctant to provide a hedge, since it
would undermine the incentive that option grants are supposed to create
and also could jeopardize the employer's tax deduction.20 9 Nevertheless,
if a firm were to take this step, the hedge would not raise the same con-
cerns as do third-party hedges. As a party to the negotiation, the firm
could monitor and protect its interests and, in the case of senior execu-
tives, would disclose the hedge to shareholders.
F. Hedging Stock
The tax penalties on options hedging sometimes apply if an execu-
tive hedges a grant of stock received as compensation (so-called restricted
stock) because such stock is taxed as salary, as is an option. In contrast,
these penalties generally do not apply if an executive seeks to hedge stock
purchased with her own funds, whether in exercising an option, in a mar-
ket purchase or, say, in founding the firm.
1. Stock Purchased with Executive's Own Funds. - Assume an executive
purchased a share of stock for $1 with her own funds. Once the stock has
appreciated to $100, she decides to hedge it. Of the tax penalties on
options hedging discussed above, the only one that applies with the same
force here is the constructive sale rule and that rule is easily avoided.
2 10
The capital loss limitation has less bite because, unlike the return on an
NQO, the return on stock is capital because it is treated as an investment,
not as salary. Thus, returns on the stock and hedge offset each other for
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b).
207. Another problem with applying the hedging rules here is WhippLe v.
Commissioner's conclusion that "full-time service to one corporation does not alone amount
to a trade or business." 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963). Yet Whipple might be distinguished as
applicable "[w] hen the only return is that of an investor," since Mr. Whipple was a major
investor in the firm. Id. In contrast, the typical executive's primary relation to the firm is
as an employee, not as an investor.
208. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (providing ordinary character for property received as salary).
209. The option grants would no longer be eligible for the "performance
compensation" exception to section 162(m). See supra note 104. Yet the firm could avoid
this issue by offering "performance" pay based on an easily attainable target (such as a low
level of accounting earnings).
210. For instance, the executive could enter into a "collar" in which she retained risk
of loss from $100 to $90 and opportunity for gain from $100 to $115.
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tax purposes. 2 11 While the straddle rules could apply, they have less im-
pact because the two most severe consequences-indefinite deferral of
hedging losses 212 and the asymmetric rate effect 2 1 3-can be avoided
under current law with a physically-settled hedge (i.e., in which the
hedged asset is actually delivered in satisfaction of the hedge)214
Whereas this structure cannot be used for options (i.e., because contrac-
tual restrictions prevent it from being transferred), no such constraint
operates on stock (i.e., since it usually can be delivered).
2 15
211. For instance, if the stock rose to $215, the executive would have $115 of capital
gain to absorb the $100 capital loss on the cash-settled collar.
212. Since this effect does not arise with physically-settled hedges under current law, it
is illustrated here with a cash-settled one. Assume the executive had two shares of stock,
each bought for $1, and hedged only one of them (i.e., with a $90-$115 collar). If the
stock rose to $215 and the executive settled the collar by paying $100 to her counterparty
(i.e., instead of delivering the stock), the straddle rules arguably would keep her from
using this capital loss until she sold both shares of stock. For a discussion of this issue, see
supra Part V.C.2.
213. Since this effect also is solved by physically-settled hedges under current law, it is
illustrated with a cash-settled one. Assume the executive had only one share of stock,
purchased for $1, and hedged it with a $90-$115 collar. If the stock declined to $20, she
could receive a cash payment of $70 upon cash settling the collar. This capital gain is short-
term-regardless of how long she has held the collar or stock-because the collar and stock
are a straddle. In effect, the gain replaces a corresponding $70 decline in the built-in
capital gain on the stock (since it declined from $90 to $20). If the executive held the
stock for more than a year before hedging it, this built-in capital gain would have been
long-term if she had sold the stock instead of hedging it. As a result, if the collar is cash
settled, long-term capital gain on the stock is replaced with less desirable short-term gain
on the collar.
214. For a discussion of why physically-settled derivatives avoid loss deferral and
asymmetric tax rates under current law, see supra Part V.E.4. In general, unlike a cash-
settled derivative, which the tax system treats as having tax consequences separate from the
hedged asset-that is, separate losses (potentially subject to deferral) or separate gains
(potentially rendered short-term)-physically-settled derivatives do not have tax
consequences separate from those on the hedged asset, at least under current law.
Instead, the physically-settled derivative merely sets the amount of gain on the hedged
asset. For discussion of a legislative proposal that would modify this treatment if enacted,
see supra note 203.
Under current law, in the examples in the preceding footnotes, if the stock falls to $20
and the executive physically settles the collar, she is treated as having sold the stock at $90,
and thus has a long-term gain of $89 (i.e., $90 minus $1)-instead of a long-term gain of
$19 on the stock and a short-term gain of $70 on the collar, as she would have if the collar
were cash-settled. Likewise, if the stock rises to $215 and the executive physically settles the
derivative, she is treated as having sold the stock at $115, and thus has a gain of $114 (i.e.,
$115 minus $1)-instead of a gain of $214 and a separate $100 loss on the collar, as she
would have if the collar were cash-settled. (Under the President's straddle proposal, in
contrast, she would have a $100 loss on the collar, which would be capitalized, generally
pro rata, into her basis in both the hedged stock and any unhedged stock. See supra note
203 (discussing proposed change in treatment of physical settlement)).
215. If the President's proposed straddle legislation is enacted in its current form, see
supra note 160, the executive could no longer use physical settlement to avoid indefinite
loss deferral. See supra note 203. As a result, the proposal would make stock hedging
more difficult, while making options hedging easier. The result would be essentially the
same tax cost for both types of hedging-a significant change from current law. The
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The absence of a tax barrier is not necessarily troubling, since stock
hedging presents less serious governance issues than options hedging. If
shareholders want to restrict stock hedging, however, they cannot rely on
the tax law for this function.
216
2. Restricted Stock Grants. - Although the tax constraints on stock
hedging are usually limited, they can be severe-sometimes, almost as
severe as on options hedging-if the executive received the stock as sal-
ary, instead of purchasing it with her own funds. Such stock hedging
resembles options hedging for two reasons. First, like the return on an
unexercised NQO (and unlike the return on stock generally), the return
on a restricted stock grant is ordinary income.2 17 As a result, if an execu-
tive hedges the stock before it vests, stock appreciation would be ordinary
but hedging losses usually would be capital, thereby implicating the capi-
tal loss limitations.2 18 Second, as with an option (and unlike with stock
generally), transfer or sale of the restricted stock is contractually re-
stricted. If the hedge must be cash settled, the straddle rules could trig-
ger loss deferral and asymmetric rates.
On the other hand, if relevant contracts permit the executive to sell
the restricted stock after it vests, the executive might structure a physi-
cally-settled hedge with a term longer than the vesting period. Then, ad-
verse tax consequences could largely be avoided, including the capital
loss limitations (since the hedge would serve to cap the sale price, instead
of generating separate losses that could be subject to deferral).219
If a physically-settled derivative is not possible, another way around
these constraints-though not a cost-free one-is a so-called section
83(b) election. The election's effect is that the value of the property is
treated as ordinary income when granted, and any subsequent apprecia-
constructive sale rules and unbalanced straddle problem could apply to either hedging
method, but capital loss limitations and asymmetric rates usually would not.
216. Stock hedging should be banned, for instance, when limits on exercising options
are eased as a way to encourage executives to own more stock. In so-called "reload"
options, executives receive new at-the-money options when they exercise, so the new grant
can restore time value lost in exercising the old one. See Gay, supra note 61, at R6
(describing reload options); see also Steven Huddart et al., Valuing the Reload Features of
Executive Stock Options 2, 5-7 (March 1999) (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 7020, published at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7020>) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing reload options and methods of valuing them).
Some of these options also have "tax reload" features, in which new options replace stock
that is sold to pay taxes. See Gay, supra note 61, at R7 (describing tax reload feature). In
effect, the firm deliberately undoes the lock-in described above. See supra Part IV. One
problem with such options, not widely recognized, is that they replace hard-to-hedge
options with easy-to-hedge stock.
217. Under I.R.C. section 83, such stock generates ordinary income, in an amount
equal to the stock's fair market value on the vesting date. This analysis assumes that the
stock is nontransferable when granted, as usually is the case.
218. See supra note 160 for discussion of the President's straddle proposals, which
could weaken the hedging barrier posed by the capital loss limitations.
219. See supra note 203 for discussion of the President's straddle proposals, which
could diminish the distinction between physically-settled and cash-settled hedges.
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tion is treated as capital gain.220 Thus, hedging the property does not
trigger a character mismatch. Because the election is available for stock
but not for a typical NQO,22 1 stock grants are easier to hedge than NQOs.
Even so, a section 83(b) election comes at a cost. Not only must the exec-
utive forgo deferral (i.e., by including the property's value in income in
the year she receives it), but she gets no deduction if she forfeits the stock
(e.g., upon leaving her job).222
VI. DESIRABILITY OF A TAx SOLUTION
Part V has described the tax law's significant role under current law.
To sum up, although it has little effect on stock hedging, the tax law
blocks options hedging more effectively than existing contract and securi-
ties law constraints in three ways. First, the tax barrier applies at firms
that do not limit hedging by contract. Second, the tax barrier affects all
U.S. executives, and not just the most senior ones (as do most securities
law barriers). Third, the tax barrier applies to basket hedges that evade
other barriers. 223 The following Table compares the impact of various
hedging constraints:
220. See Raasch & Rowland, supra note 96, at 39-41 (describing consequences of a
section 83(b) election).
221. The reason is that a section 83(b) election is available only for "transfers of
property." See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978) ("property [must be] transferred (within the
meaning of § 1.83-3(a))"). Grant of an option that does not have readily ascertainable
value is not considered a "transfer of property." See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) (2) (as
amended in 1985) (noting that "[t]he grant of an option to purchase certain property
does not constitute a transfer of such property" and cross-referencing § 1.83-7 for "the
extent to which the grant of the option itself is subject to section 83"); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
7(a) (1978) (option that does not have readily ascertainable fair market value is not subject
to section 83 until it is exercised).
222. See I.R.C. §83(b)(1) ("[Ihf such property is subsequently forfeited, no
deduction shall be allowed in respect of such forfeiture."); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (a)
(1978) (same). Any deduction that is still permitted, such as upon selling the stock at a
loss, is a less desirable capital loss. This prospect is not of concern to someone who is
hedging, though. She is content as long as both the hedge and hedged asset generate
gains and losses that can offset each other for tax purposes.
223. For two reasons, aggressive executives cannot avoid the tax barrier, as they can
avoid section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and disclosure requirements, by
relying on a colorable claim and expecting that it will never be challenged. First, there is
simply no colorable claim under current law to get the executive the tax treatment she will
likely need: usable ordinary hedging losses. Second, the issue cannot remain secret.
Indeed, if the executive has hedging losses, she will have to bring them to the
government's attention by listing them as a deduction. More generally, the tax system has




TABLE 14: CONTRACTUAL, SECURITIES LAW AND TAX CONSTRAINTS
Type Normative Securities Law & Contract Tax
Assessment
Single-stock Usually undesirable Insiders blocked; noninsiders permitted, Blocked
option hedge subject to pledging cost
Disproportionate Usually undesirable Arguably permitted, subject to pledging Blocked
basket hedge cost
Broad-based Possibly desirable Permitted, subject to pledging cost Blocked
basket hedge
Stock hedge Less clear Permitted Permitted
Yet the tax law obviously is not the only way to fill these gaps. With-
out it, shareholders would have a strong interest in finding another. To
an extent, executives would have an interest in cooperating (or at least
seeming to cooperate) in order to earn extra compensation for taking
risk. Given this potential confluence of interests, it seems likely that if the
tax barrier is repealed-or, for that matter, if it had never arisen-con-
tracts and the securities laws would be revised to block options hedging
more effectively.
The question is, then, how desirable is it to address this problem with
the tax law? In my view, it would be better to rely on contract or securi-
ties laws, but the tax barrier is a reasonably satisfactory solution in the
United States as long as it is not repealed inadvertently. To develop this
point, this Part describes the advantages of using the tax law, and then
turns to the disadvantages. In brief, although there may be an adminis-
trative cost savings in using the tax system (since it is already monitoring
options hedging for tax policy reasons), the tax barrier proves both
under- and over-inclusive, and is also potentially unstable.
A. Advantages of Using the Tax System: Administrative Costs and Transition
Lags
Since Professor Surrey's influential work,224 the costs of pursuing so-
cial policy through tax have been well understood. Even so, some of
these costs are absent here, for a somewhat atypical reason: The U.S. tax
system already monitors and punishes options hedging for tax policy rea-
sons unrelated to corporate governance. 225 Since the tax system is al-
ready pursuing these objectives, the added administrative cost is modest
when society "subcontracts" this corporate governance task to the tax sys-
tem.2 26 Because no new tax rules must be added, policing this practice
224. See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax
Expenditures 35-39 (1973) (proposing direct expenditure programs as an alternative to
tax expenditures).
225. For a discussion of these tax policies, see supra Part V.A.
226. Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 1010 (1986) ("Tax incentives efficiently communicate
government policies through an existing information network, that is, the network of
professional advice and assistance that exists to comply with the tax law."). The tax barrier
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does not add to the Code's complexity or increase compliance costs. Ex-
ecutives must already keep records, file returns, hire tax advisors, etc.
The government, likewise, already is monitoring this compliance.
2 27
While derivative transactions are hard to monitor, U.S. tax authorities
have the advantage of third-party reporting (reinforced by penalties on
the third parties for failing to comply).228
Without the tax barrier, firms and the SEC would have to tighten
existing contractual and securities law limits on options hedging.
Although attainable, the goal imposes costs. It is harder than restricting
sale or exercise, because hedging does not require the firm's participa-
tion and thus is hard to detect, absent disclosure. 22 9 To require disclo-
sure, the firm (or the SEC) must define hedging. This task is not easy,
since new forms of hedging are constantly being developed. Narrow defi-
nitions are easy to evade, while broad ones (such as those that include
basket hedges) will be resisted as infringing on an executive's privacy in
making investments unrelated to the firm. Either way, executives will
need legal advice about how to comply, in addition to the tax advice they
already are procuring. Likewise, firms (and the SEC) will have to hire
employees to monitor compliance. Especially if enforced by the firm
(rather than the SEC), the regime could impose morale costs. Executives
to exercise shares this administrative cost advantage, since this rule also already exists for
tax-administration reasons. A difference, though, is that this constraint is easier to
duplicate without the tax system (e.g., through penalties for early exercise or rewards for
longer holding periods) since the firm, as the option counterparty, can easily monitor
exercise.
227. Unfortunately, IRS enforcement activities are reported to have waned in recent
months. Although the extent of the decline is disputed, IRS officials have acknowledged
the problem. See, e.g., George Guttman, The Interplay of Enforcement and Voluntary
Compliance, 83 Tax Notes 1683, 1683 (1999) ("[It is unclear whether the decrease in
enforcement action is as pronounced as some claim .. "); David Cay Johnston, Tax
Professionals See Pitfalls in the New I.R.S., N.Y. Times, July 18, 1999, at 21 ("[I]n the
agency's zeal to be friendly... tax enforcement has shriveled."); David CayJohnston, IRS
Is Bolstering Efforts to Curb Cheating on Taxes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2000, at Al ("[T]he
Clinton administration is proposing more money to find cheaters and make them pay up.
And the [IRS's] top official has begun emphasizing that catching cheaters is as important
as helping honest taxpayers."). While lax enforcement obviously is not helpful, I suspect
the tax barrier to options hedging is largely unaffected. Even though lax enforcement is
likely to encourage aggressive but colorable positions, it is hard to find even a plausible
case under current law for avoiding the tax barrier. If their only course is to commit tax
fraud-that is, to take a wholly unjustified position-executives will have strong reasons
not to do so. If nothing else, even in the current environment their high incomes increase
the risk of being audited (and, arguably, the reputational cost of being caught).
228. Thus, the investment bank usually must report to the IRS any payments it makes
to executives on a hedge. See I.R.C. § 6041(a). Likewise, employers must report an
executive's salary (including option gains) to the government and withhold a portion as
tax.
229. See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 101 & n.16 (noting that "[d]erivatives markets
facilitate anonymous trading" and that "[t]he enforcement problem [associated with
insider trading] is considerably more difficult when the trading occurs in derivatives than
when it occurs in the stock market").
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may resent disclosing to the board personal information unrelated to the
firm, even though they are used to disclosing such information to the
IRS. For boards, it may be easier to have the tax system prevent hedging,
instead of taking on the "bad cop" role themselves.
Given these costs, it would have taken some time for contractual and
securities law limits to be refined, and if the tax barrier had not been in
place, a significant volume of options hedging could have occurred (and,
indeed, could still occur if the tax barrier is repealed). The parties most
likely to seek improved restrictions-shareholders and the SEC-are
likely to learn of hedging opportunities only after executives hear about
them. After all, the over-the-counter derivatives market is a recent crea-
tion whose implications for options hedging are not equally evident to
everyone. Executives have had an informational edge, since investment
banks have an incentive to educate them and to keep the education dis-
creet 23 0-a goal facilitated by porous disclosure obligations. Nor are ex-
ecutives likely to initiate the process of limiting hedging more effectively.
Once the process begins, executives may cooperate to avert reputational
and financial sanctions, but the onus will be on shareholders and the SEC
to initiate the process (e.g., once media coverage has alerted them to the
issue).
B. Disadvantages of Using the Tax System: Imperfect Scope and Instability
1. Under-Inclusive Scope. - Notwithstanding these advantages, use of
the tax law here carries disadvantages as well. Since the tax barrier was
not crafted with corporate governance in mind, it is not surprising that
the barrier to options hedging is both under- and over-inclusive when
evaluated from that perspective. In particular, it has three potential gaps.
First, the barrier applies with much less force to stock hedging, although
such hedging is less of a concern.
231
Second, the tax barrier does not affect executives who are not subject
to U.S. tax liability because they are not U.S. citizens and their work does
not have sufficient nexus to the U.S. economy.23 2 This problem takes on
particular urgency because option grants outside the United States are
becoming increasingly common.233 In many cases, foreign firms seek to
imitate U.S. compensation practices. Without the tax barrier, a key piece
of the puzzle is missing. While tax and regulatory barriers to hedging in
other jurisdictions are beyond this Article's scope, they should be scruti-
230. Investment bankers could expect fees from the hedge, as well as from work that
grateful executives could provide (e.g., securities offerings).
231. See supra Part V.F and Part II.A.5.
232. U.S. citizens and resident aliens are subject to tax on their worldwide income,
regardless of where it is earned. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1 (b) (as amended in 1974);Joel D.
Kuntz & Robert J. Peroni, 1 U.S. International Taxation B1-50 (1992). In contrast,
foreigners generally are taxed on salary income only if it is "effectively connected" to the
United States. I.R.C. § 871(b). See 2 Kuntz & Peroni, supra, at C1-75.
233. See supra note 20.
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nized. If they are ineffective, as I suspect they may be, 234 contractual or
regulatory responses are urgently needed when this U.S. compensation
trend is exported.
Third, even in the United States, the tax barrier to options hedging
has a gap. Although it creates chilling ex ante risks in all cases, some
costs (i.e., from the capital loss limitations, straddle rules, and asymmetric
tax rates) arise only if the stock price increases after the executive hedges,
not if it declines. 235 However, this gap may not be very significant. Risk
neutral executives should be deterred because these costs as the stock
rises are not offset by any benefits as the stock price falls. For risk-averse
executives, moreover, the bad outcome is a sufficient deterrent. Nor can
executives usually predict a decline in the stock price with certainty. A
rational executive will not drive down the stock price merely to break
even on her hedge, since the reputational costs of such a "success" could
be career-ending. In addition, an executive cannot legally use inside in-
formation. 23 6 Although she may have advantages in assessing public in-
formation, it is hard to be certain that the stock price will fall in absolute
terms,237 since even poor performers drift upward in a rising market.
238
2. Over-Inclusive Scope. - Not only does that tax barrier omit some
hedging that should be covered, but it arguably covers some hedging that
should be omitted. Specifically, the tax barrier penalizes broad-based
basket hedges along with disproportionate ones, 239 even though the for-
234. For instance, the U.S. tax barrier is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Even
jurisdictions that pursue the tax policies underlying the U.S. tax barrier (i.e., limiting the
timing option and separately accounting for active and passive income) are likely to do so
by different means.
235. The tax risk can be reduced somewhat if the executive pays for a put by giving
the counterparty cash, instead of a call option. Then, the maximum nondeductible loss as
the stock price rises will be the premium paid for the put. Yet although the tax loss is no
longer unlimited, it still can be quite sizable. In any event, purchasing a put for cash is
seldom attractive because the out-of-pocket cost is so large. See supra Part I.B.
236. Firm trading policies, discussed supra in notes 65-67 and accompanying text,
also impede use of inside information by preventing executives from trading except
immediately after periodic disclosure.
237. Indeed, an executive's predictive powers may be fairly unreliable. In a recent
survey, Smartmoney.com noted that, over a twenty-four-week period in which the Dow
Jones Industrial Average rose by 9%, the 92 companies in which insiders had increased
their holdings had an average drop in stock price of 2.7%. The 227 firms in which insiders
reduced their holdings were up an average of 16.8%. See Paul R. La Monica, The Clueless
Insiders, Smartmoney.com (Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.smartmoney.com/smt/screen/
index.cfm?story=19990211intro> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
238. The tax risk also generates two second-order effects. By thinning the ranks of
executives who would be interested in hedging, it may discourage investment bankers from
marketing these products. From the executive's perspective, moreover, the tax risk creates
a signaling cost. If hedging is plausible only for those who expect declines, it becomes all
the more embarrassing if detected.
239. In defense of the tax barrier, its penalty for disproportionate basket hedges is
more severe than for broad-based ones, because only the former is clearly a straddle-with
the attendant risk of loss deferral and asymmetric rates. See supra note 152. Yet the
capital loss limitations still apply, even to broad-based basket hedges. Unfortunately, if the
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mer may appeal to shareholders in replicating an indexed option. More
generally, the tax barrier has the disadvantages of a uniform rule im-
posed by the government. Off-the-rack government interventions may
discourage private parties from developing better solutions. Executives
are not equally risk averse and do not have uniform preferences, and so a
single solution is unlikely to be appropriate in all cases.240
Nevertheless, this concern should not be overstated, because a uni-
form ban could have advantages in this context-although, if a govern-
ment-imposed rule is desired, it should be supplied by the SEC rather
than the tax system. A uniform ban is less daunting here because substi-
tutes for options hedging remain available. Instead of allowing execu-
tives to hedge with third parties, the firm itself can supply a hedge or
otherwise adjust the executive's pay. These steps do not trigger the tax
barrier to hedging, and they impose fewer transaction costs and are more
transparent than third-party hedging.241 A uniform ban does have an ad-
vantage, moreover. Without a clear prohibition, shareholders may find it
expensive to "price" the diverse hedging restrictions that could arise.242
Informed shareholders know that an executive's incentive is to stop the
appearance, but perhaps not the reality, of hedging. They also realize
that only careful observers can distinguish between "real" and "staged"
anti-hedging policies. To ensure that, in the absence of a uniform ban,
executives are not exploiting these impediments to monitoring, share-
holders will have to scrutinize details of the firm's basket-hedging policy,
such as the minimum tracking error it requires and the vigor of the
board's enforcement efforts. 243 The game may not be worth the candle,
President's straddle proposal is enacted, see supra note 160, the relative severity of the
penalties would be reversed. Hedges that create straddles, such as single-stock and
disproportionate basket hedges, would avoid the capital loss limitations because the
proposal would add hedging losses to the option's basis. Yet this ability to capitalize loss
would not be available if the option and hedge were not a straddle. As a broad-based
basket hedge arguably would not constitute a straddle with a compensatory option, the
capital loss limitations would still apply.
240. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 103 ("One-size-fits-all is as bad in the corporate
market as in the clothing market."). Relatedly, there are efficiencies (and perhaps
appealing distributional effects) when parties to a contract internalize the costs of
implementing it. This concern is less compelling here because the marginal cost to the tax
system of penalizing hedging is low.
241. While the use of puts and noncontingent cash payments could render
compensation nondeductible (because they would undermine performance-based
compensations, see supra note 104), the firm could avoid this issue with nominally
performance-based cash bonuses or indexed options, albeit at the cost of less favorable
accounting. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
242. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1678 (1989) ("Put simply,
standardization of contract terms through the use of mandatory legal rules reduces
information costs for investors.").
243. Sometimes boards enforce policies only as needed to avoid adverse publicity.
For example, at the insistence of institutional investors, many boards require managers to
purchase stock with their own funds. Yet the Wall Street Journal reports that these programs
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since any single shareholder will not capture all benefits of monitoring.
Instead, rationally ignorant shareholders may assume that hedging is oc-
curring at all firms, and particular firms and executives may have diffi-
culty rebutting this presumption.244 This problem is less likely if the
hedging ban and enforcement mechanism are uniform. Understanding
one regime is cheaper than scouring variations for hidden loopholes.
245
Yet if the government must intervene, the securities laws provide a better
vehicle than does the tax law. Although the tax law has a potential ad-
ministrative cost advantage, described above, the SEC has the offsetting
advantage of greater corporate governance expertise. Indeed, the tax sys-
tem has a poor track record, at least in terms of corporate governance
steps it has taken deliberately.
246
3. Instability. - A further vulnerability, in addition to its under- and
over-inclusive scope, is that the tax barrier might be unsettled as inadver-
tently as it fell into place. The staff advising on tax legislation or adminis-
trative pronouncements is unlikely to consider (or even to be aware of) a
new tax rule's corporate governance implications. For example, the
asymmetric-tax-rate effect arises only if different tax rates govern ordinary
income and long-term capital gain-something that was not true as re-
cently as 1986-and that may cease to be true in the future (especially if
the Democrats regain control of Congress while retaining the White
House) .247 More fundamentally, two different legislative proposals in the
last two sessions of Congress would inadvertently weaken, or even elimi-
nate, the tax barrier if enacted. Proposed changes in the straddle rules
offered by the President in February, 2000, could largely eviscerate the
tax barrier.248 Repeal of the AMT, as proposed by Chairman Archer in
1999, would allow options hedging with swaps. 249 The latter outcome
would also be feasible if swap expenses become deductible under the
often are public relations charades. See Gogoi, supra note 62, at R3. Some firms lend
executives the purchase price and then forgive or guarantee the loan. See id. (citing
examples of Baxter International Inc. and Eastman Kodak Co.). The guidelines are
seldom enforced. "I would fall over backwards," one compensation consultant said, "if the
company fired someone for not meeting guidelines." Id. (quoting Carol Bowie, director of
publications at Executive Compensation Advisory Services).
244. See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1522 (describing the problem that potential
investors are unsure whether a firm's structural rules are unduly favorable to management
as "a special case of the market for lemons").
245. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1565 (1989) ("[W]ith mandatory terms, the investor is on an equal
footing with the firm, because the investor can spread the cost of understanding charter
terms across all firms considered for investment.").
246. See supra Part IV.A (noting flaws in ISO rules and section 162(m)); see also
sources cited in supra note 17 (criticizing other uses of tax law to pursue corporate
governance goals).
247. I have written elsewhere about the instability of the capital gains preference. See
Schizer, supra note 107, at 1579-82, 1592-93, 1601-06.
248. See supra note 160.
249. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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AMT, a more modest step that is reasonably likely in light of the tax bar's
ongoing debate about the tax rules for swaps.
250
In more general terms, the political currents that can alter the rele-
vant tax laws-or, for that matter, keep them in place-spring from
sources broader than, and, indeed, far removed from, corporate govern-
ance. This can be a strength, in that executives cannot capture the pro-
cess. Nevertheless, it is also a weakness. If the tax law changes in re-
sponse to unrelated pressures and concerns, a likely prospect in my
opinion, the tax barrier will be gone. In the coming years, then, other
hedging barriers will be needed.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Universal Contractual Prohibitions
Given the tax barrier's overbreadth and instability, as well as its lim-
ited effect outside the United States, all firms should restrict options
hedging by contract. Like vesting provisions, these limits should govern
all executives who receive options, rather than just senior officers. Thus,
firms should restrict single-stock options hedging and disproportionate
basket hedging at least as much as exercise2 51 and should punish offend-
ers through measures such as revocation of option grants.
25 2
Firms should also develop policies on stock hedging and broad-based
basket hedging. Since these practices can improve managerial incentives
in some cases, the concern they raise most consistently is transparency.
Instead of a ban, then, firms should permit such hedging as long as it is
disclosed to the firm, so the compensation committee can make in-
formedjudgments about executives' incentives. 253 Firms may also choose
to release this information to shareholders in some cases (e.g., for execu-
tives with sufficiently large option grants or stock holdings).
B. Securities Laws2
5 4
Since basket hedges can affect an executive's incentives-often favor-
ably in the case of broad-based baskets and unfavorably in the case of
disproportionate ones-these practices should be disclosed. The SEC
250. See NYSBA Swap Report, supra note 174, at 1306-10.
251. In my view, firms should restrict hedging more severely than exercise. Exercise
triggers the firm's tax deduction, but hedging does not. Moreover, exercise is discouraged
by noncontractual constraints that may not apply to hedging, such as loss of time value.
252. Firms might distinguish disproportionate basket hedging from broad-based
basket hedging through tracking error or the extent of the firm's representation in the
basket. Alternatively, some firms may prefer to ban all basket hedging, while offering
indexed options to those who want them.
253. A more restrictive policy, which also is plausible, is to have a general prohibition
on these practices, while authorizing the compensation committee to grant exceptions
upon request.
254. Although this discussion refers explicitly to U.S. securities law, corresponding
adjustments should be made in other jurisdictions.
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can accomplish this result by modifying the disclosure rules promulgated
under section 16.
More effective hedging disclosure would allow shareholders to make
informed judgments, and also should induce boards to negotiate contrac-
tual responses, which should decrease the need for mandatory hedging
bans. On the other hand, a mandatory ban offers shareholders the ability
to evaluate the ban cheaply, which lessens the likelihood of "staged" anti-
hedging policies and lemon pricing. On balance, this latter advantage
justifies a mandatory ban on single-stock hedging and disproportionate
basket hedging, since these practices seldom serve a constructive purpose
(or, at least, one that cannot be achieved in a more transparent way).255
However, a mandatory ban is not appropriate for stock hedging and
broad-based basket hedging, as such hedging sometimes creates favorable
incentives. 256 Thus, Rule 16c-4 should not be extended to stock or broad-
based basket hedging. However, the rule (and authorities construing it)
should more clearly prohibit disproportionate basket hedges by adding a
test based on tracking error or representation. Likewise, the SEC should
continue to read the rule to bar single-stock options hedging, even if the
rule is no longer applied to hedges of other derivative positions (such as
convertible preferred).257
Finally, the SEC should expand the group of executives subject to
disclosure obligations and section 16(c) so that, in addition to insiders as
currently defined, the group includes those who have options on more
than a threshold value (or amount) of stock or options. If this group's
incentives are sufficiently important to warrant large grants, these incen-
tives are worth monitoring and safeguarding. Alternatively, if these in-
centives are not important (e.g., because the executives are not senior
enough to influence firm performance), firms should stop giving op-
tions, rather than giving them and allowing hedging.
CONCLUSION
In revealing the difficulty of options hedging in the United States,
this Article confirms the relevance of debates about the proper structure
255. For instance, an executive who wants less firm-specific risk can dispose of vested
options and can negotiate for a higher proportion of cash in future compensation.
Nevertheless, if scenarios arise in which options hedging would prove desirable for all
concerned-a remote prospect given the costliness of hedging and the availability of
alternatives-section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be amended to
allow exceptions to its ban. Any exceptions should be conditioned on strict procedural
safeguards, such as unanimous approval by independent directors coupled with prominent
disclosure to shareholders.
256. A ban could plausibly be justified on the theory that other means (such as
indexed options) are available to attain these goals more transparently. Yet as long as the
transactions are disclosed in an effective manner, the harm from permitting them should
be limited.
257. See supra note 85, noting that the SEC has offered section 16(c) relief in certain
instances without offering a rationale.
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of options packages. This Article also demonstrates an advantage, not
previously understood, of motivating executives through options instead
of stock ownership:258 The tax law makes it much more difficult to hedge
options than stock.259 Indeed, stock ownership may not motivate execu-
tives, absent effective disclosure and contractual limits on stock hedging.
For the same reason, recent empirical studies measuring the effect of
stock price fluctuations on CEO wealth are more reliable to the extent
that they consider options rather than stock. 260
There is a more general lesson here about derivatives. Institutional
detail matters profoundly. Many have observed the derivatives market's
potential to change the tax system, the capital markets, and, indeed, the
economy as a whole. This prediction is clearly correct. Derivatives are
already changing our economic lives. Yet in assessing their impact, we
must consider the tax and other legal regimes governing derivatives.
Although these regimes are obscure and often highly technical, the care-
ful student can reap rich rewards because the devil (or, in this case, the
angel) is in the details.
Such careful study is necessary in adapting options for use in other
jurisdictions. In the United States, the tax law has facilitated effective use
of options. Tax laws in other jurisdictions are unlikely to serve this func-
tion, since the U.S. tax barrier arose in response to tax policy objectives
that will not be relevant in some other jurisdictions, and will be pursued
differently in others. Without effective barriers to hedging, though, use
of options is not advisable. This Article offers further evidence that gov-
ernance practices are creatures of law and culture, as well as
economics.
2 6 1
258. Others have already observed the superior risk effects of options. See, e.g.,
Tufano, supra note 53, at 1129 (linking managerial ownership of options and risk
management).
259. To be precise, the key distinction for tax purposes is whether the property was
received as compensation or was purchased with the executive's own money. Thus, grants
of stock as salary can still be difficult to hedge in some cases, whereas stock purchased by
the executive (including through exercise of a compensatory option) is not. Rule 16-c(4),
in contrast, distinguishes between options and stock-regardless of how they were
acquired-and in essence allows all stock hedging. See C.F.R. § 240.16-c(4) (1999).
260. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 QJ. Econ. 653, 668-70 (1998) (concluding that the sensitivity of CEO
wealth to fluctuations in stock prices is greater than previously recognized). For measures
of stock ownership, the executive's obligation since the mid-1990s to disclose single stock
hedges is helpful but the absence of disclosure on baskets represents a potentially
significant gap. See also supra text accompanying note 76 (commercial services do not
report hedging to market).
261. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace
and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 508, 540 (1999)
(Japanese firms were motivated to invest in human capital, not in response to lifetime
employment policies, but in an effort to undermine organized labor. Therefore, the U.S.




The impact of tax on corporate governance has been under-ex-
plored, perhaps because tax experts seldom think about corporate gov-
ernance, and corporate experts seldom think about tax. Whereas U.S.
tax law sometimes impedes effective corporate governance, 262 its impact
is more balanced than scholars have recognized. For now, contract and
the securities law are not limiting hedging comprehensively. Thus, the
tax law is making a significant contribution: It keeps insiders from using
disproportionate basket hedges and prevents less senior executives from
using these and more straightforward hedges. While the tax law is not
the best method of pursuing this goal-particularly because this regime
can change for unrelated reasons-the tax law is, nevertheless, serving a
useful corporate governance function. There may be similar stories yet to
be told.
More generally, we should recognize the profound influence of our
tax laws. Their effects ripple throughout the economy, sometimes in ways
no one intended and few recognized. We should approach changes in
the tax system, especially fundamental ones, with humility. Some collat-
eral consequences will be good. Others will not. The only certainty is
that no one can anticipate them all.
262. See supra note 17.
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